

PLAYING THE GAME: THE EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE POLITICAL  
MANEUVERING OF GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR  
DURING HIS EARLY CAREER

by

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## ABSTRACT

Gaius Julius Caesar's meteoric rise to power in Late-Republican Rome was arguably one of the most successful bids for power in the history of politics. His commanding use of the Forum, the political system, rhetoric, and propaganda stands unparalleled in history. The strategies that would one day allow him to take up the dictatorship and usher in the age of the Emperors were initiated very early in his career, some even appearing before his entry into politics.

While it can be said that the end results of Caesar's methods were radical, can the same be said with regards to the means he employed to achieve those ends? Focusing on the early stages of his political career with an eye to how he campaigned and conducted his extra-legislative affairs, it is possible to determine the extent to which his actions in this arena would be perceived by Romans of the time.

Due to the fact that the majority of written accounts contemporaneous with Caesar's career are negative, a thorough investigation requires the introduction of source material that does not hinge upon the biases of the day. For this, the *Commentariolum Petitionis* is uniquely suited. The *Commentariolum* provides a unique lens through which an understanding of the important questions regarding the methods and means used in Late-Republican politics might be reached.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	1
Ancient Sources .....	3
Modern Sources .....	5
THE FORMATIVE YEARS .....	7
Building a Reputation .....	7
Setting the Stage .....	20
The Strategy .....	25
The Return .....	26
THE MILITARY TRIBUNATE AND THE QUAESTORSHIP .....	27
The Military Tribune .....	27
The Quaestorship .....	34
Funeral for Aunt Julia .....	34
Mourning Cornelia and Finding Alexander .....	38
THE AEDILESHIP AND THE PRAETORSHIP .....	44
The Eternal City .....	44
The Aedileship .....	46
Conspiracy: Real or Implied .....	48
A Hard Two Years .....	57
The Praetorship .....	62
The First Day and the Longest Day .....	64
The Propraetorship .....	67
EPILOGUE .....	69
To Triumph or Petition? .....	69
Epilogue .....	71

Conclusion .....	74
APPENDIX .....	78
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	105

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## INTRODUCTION

“Friends, Romans and countrymen, lend me your ears;  
I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.  
The evil that men do lives after them;  
The good is of interred with their bones;  
So let it be with Caesar.”

These words, which are some of the most immortal words never spoken, were put into the mouth of Marcus Antonius, a man who died a millennia and a half before the birth of the man who wrote them. Such was the impact of the man called Gaius Julius Caesar and the renown that followed him. The running debate over the intervening two-thousand fifty-nine years on his goodness or maliciousness has become a topic for the ages. From Suetonius and Plutarch to Mommesson, Meier, Gelzer, and Gruen, the desire to understand the man who affected the lives of countless people in countless places, on every one of those 751,535 days since 44 B.C.E., has been a passion, nay obsession, for the Western world. If ever immortality was achieved by mortal man, it was achieved by Caesar.

For the historian, however, this notoriety creates certain problems. Caesar was a polarizing force. The only information on his life and actions comes from either ardent supporters, vehement detractors, or from Caesar himself. The dose of cynicism required for an unbiased reading of Caesar’s life and character is nearly always fatal, leading either to an abrupt failure of the heart or a loss of the head. In this way, the adulation or



hatred of the man brings with it unsound conclusions and questionable theories, which are all piled, one upon another, in the repository of human knowledge and left to languish without any hope of reconciliation.

This is due in part to the questions that are asked regarding the life of Caesar. Was he a good person or a bad one?<sup>1</sup> What were his long-term goals and intentions? Was he the quintessential Roman or a warmongering radical outsider?<sup>2</sup> Were the excesses he displayed a signal of the eventual collapse of the Republic? Such questions are on the one hand unanswerable and on the other hand irrelevant. The question of his morality requires us either to conjecture as to the morality of Late-Republican Rome or, even worse, to apply the morality of the modern day on Caesar. As for his long-term goals for the Republic, this question can only lead to speculation and is not helpful to the historian, as the effect of possible legislation on the course of history is fictive fiction at best. The question of his radical or conservative leanings becomes irrelevant when it is considered that many different authors have arrived at either one of these disparate conclusions, while utilizing the same set of data. Finally, the question of Caesar's excesses and its effect on the collapse of the Republic cannot be answered as it is. However, with a small amount of manipulation, the question becomes feasible to answer and would actually be an aid to understanding how the Republic functioned and how Caesar used that to his advantage. Such an inquiry cannot be used to question the time after Caesar's death, but

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<sup>1</sup> See Plutarch and Suetonius as the archetypal purveyors of this question as they searched for *exempla*.

<sup>2</sup> See M. Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesmen*; Trans. by Peter Needham; Harvard University Press; 1968 for Caesar as the classic Roman senator and C. Meier, *Caesar*; Trans. by David McLintock; BasicBooks, New York; 1982. Meier departs significantly from other biographers in that he believes that Caesar cast himself as the new Sulla.

it can be used to understand the time during which he lived. Hence the question: Were Caesar's extravagant extra-legislative political practices during his early career, from his formative years to the Praetorship, a simple inflation of the common political practices of his day? In order to begin answering this question, a survey of the literature, both ancient and modern, must be undertaken.<sup>3</sup>

### **Ancient Sources**

There exists a multiplicity of ancient source materials surrounding Caesar's early career. Plutarch, Suetonius, Cicero, Sallust, Aulus Gellius, Arrian, and Pliny the Elder all concerned themselves with the *acta* of Caesar, and nearly all from varying points of view: Plutarch and Suetonius from the perspective of biographers, far removed from their subject, but immersed in a wealth of documents from the time in question; Cicero, in the form of letters to friends and speeches, gives a unique first-hand account of the day-to-day activities in the Senate and the Forum. Sallust, a long-time supporter of Caesar, illustrates his calmness under fire, his eloquence and his pursuit of justice during the chaotic times of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Aulus Gellius preserved unique accounts of his battles in the senate and speeches, citing Julius Caesar's rhetoric as a bench mark for proper grammar and syntax. Arrian recounts his exploits on the field of battle throughout the growing Roman Empire. Pliny the Elder uses Caesar in short tableau to illustrate the history of metallurgical trends in the city of Rome in his Natural History. Finally, Caesar himself weighs in with his explanation of his actions, in Gaul and during

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<sup>3</sup> See Z. Yavetz, *Julius Caesar and his Public Image*; Cornell Uni. Pr., New York; 1983 pgs. 7-58 for one of the most exhaustive historiographical studies of 19th- and 20th-century literature on Caesar.

the Civil Wars, providing the modern scholar with a unique self portrait, a testament to how Caesar viewed himself.

This wealth of information is not without its perils, however, as the sources are riddled with inconsistencies and opinions, most of which can be attributed to the author's political views and intended audience. In order to make sense of the differing opinions found within these works, it becomes necessary to add another source, the *Commentariolum Petitionis*, a work attributed to the brother of M. Tullius Cicero, Quintus.<sup>4</sup> Through this work, a handbook for electioneering, it is possible to outline the normal procedure for extra-legislative activities, both during the campaigning process and during the holding of the office itself. The *Commentariolum* is distinct in that it can be interpreted both as a descriptive and prescriptive source on Late-Republican political maneuvering, as it both describes how the campaign process worked for the individual politician and is designed to instruct the political hopeful on how to implement the basic strategies. Utilizing this unique source, it is possible to move beyond the opinion of the authors themselves about a particular episode and to weigh it against a consistent and effective model of Late-Republican political 'normalcy'.

Unfortunately, the *Commentariolum* has been used to speak generally about the political process itself rather than the politicians place in that process, and has even been used to make radical speculations about voting practices.<sup>5</sup> The focus of the

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<sup>4</sup> The question of authorship will be discussed both in Chap. 1 and in the Appendix, which contains a translation and commentary.

<sup>5</sup> See H. Mauritsen, *Plebs and Politics*; Cambridge University Press; 2001 pgs. 104-106. Here Mauritsen argues for the possibility of multiple votes for each citizen by using a line from the *Commentariolum*, "quis enim reperiri potest tam improbus civis qui velit uno suffragio duas in rem publicam sicas destringere." It should be clear, even to the first-year Latin student, that "uno suffragio" is the number of votes and "duas sicas" refers to Antonius and Cataline, whom Quintus has been deriding for a number of previous chapters.

*Commentariolum* is the politician and what the politician must do to secure the vote and maintain power. Anything outside of this line of inquiry becomes suspect. As a result, the *Commentariolum* will be used here specifically to demonstrate the strategies employed by politicians in navigating the political scene during the Late-Republic, thereby bypassing the concerns of dubious authorship. In addition, I have included a translation of my own creation both as an aid to the reader, so that the broader context of the document itself might be understood, and so that the reader will be able to identify more easily the source and reasons for my conclusions.

### **Modern Sources**

In truth, the number and variance in opinions surrounding the political career of Caesar have not lessened with time and so it was prudent to select, as Yavetz did, sources that best outlined the basic theories surrounding Caesar.<sup>6</sup> In order to encapsulate the more standard readings of Julius Caesar as the consummate Roman senator, M. Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, and as the radical outsider, C. Meier's Caesar, have been utilized. To these were added two new perspectives: A.D. Kahn, The Education of Julius Caesar,<sup>7</sup> for the Julius Caesar steeped in tradition, born and bred to be uniquely Roman in a time of decaying values, and W.J. Tatum, Always I Am Caesar,<sup>8</sup> for a view of the Caesar who was, above all, a product of his times, a natural development of the politics at the end of the Republic and the genesis of all that came after. These sources represent the

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<sup>6</sup> See Yavetz; Public Image pgs. 10-14.

<sup>7</sup> A.D. Kahn, The Education of Julius Caesar; Schocken Books; 1986

<sup>8</sup> W.J. Tatum, Always I Am Caesar; Blackwell Publishing; 2008

best examples of the broad spectrum of modern opinions on Caesar, and together they present the scholar with a manageable amount of data and conclusions.

There is, however, one thing on which all these sources agree. Politics in the Late-Republic had become Rome's favorite outdoor sport, a dangerous game, played by top notch players on a field specially prepared for it. The managers and the spectators were one and the same, able, by their praise or derision, to make a career or to end one. When Caesar stepped onto the field, the game would never be the same again.

## THE FORMATIVE YEARS

### **Building a Reputation**

In comparison to the other lives set down in the works of Suetonius and Plutarch, the life of Gaius Julius Caesar begins rather abruptly.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the modern student of Roman History comes face to face with a Caesar who has already taken up the *toga virilis* and who is striking out on the path which he felt compelled to take up on account of his illustrious ancestry. It is not difficult to turn back the pages of history and see the deleterious machinations that had been brought to bear on the Republic during the last quarter century before his birth, the effects of which were being felt acutely at the time.<sup>10</sup> Endless war, civil strife, and the unyielding traditionalism of Roman politics had left the Republic unable to cope with the expansion of its domain and had left its unwary elite susceptible to the poking and prodding of powerful men.<sup>11</sup> For Rome, this was a time of unparalleled violence and near-constant shifts in power as the waves of change beat steadily and soundly against the sandy shore of the Republic. The events that would

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<sup>9</sup> Suet. 1.1 and Plut. 1.1. Both Suetonius and Plutarch, the major biographers that have been transmitted to us, begin Caesar's life at the time of the death of Caesar's father and his marriage to Cornelia, respectively. While the Latin manuscript edited by M. Ihm, which is featured in the J.C. Rolfe translation of the LCL, admits a lacunae for the initial pages of Suetonius' Caesar, the eds. Sintenis and Bekker do not allow for such a lacunae in the LCL of Plutarch's Lives.

<sup>10</sup> The timeline of Suetonius suggests the events of the first *capto* occur in 85/84 B.C.E. thereby placing his birth sometime around 100 B.C.E. See Suet. 1.1, Loeb Classical Library, Trans. J.C. Rolfe, Harvard University Press; 1998 F.N. 2

<sup>11</sup> For a more thorough reconstruction of Caesar's life and times, see Kahn; Education 3-51

unfold during Caesar's earliest years would have a profound effect on Rome and its governance; furthermore, its effect on Caesar and his family would be even greater,<sup>12</sup> for in this new world of violent power grabs and proscriptions, there were only two kinds of politicians: the quick and the dead.<sup>13</sup> So it was when Caesar embarked upon the path he undoubtedly presumed would be the beginning of his career.

Caesar, during the consulship of G. Marius and L. Cornelius Cinna,<sup>14</sup> had been granted the position of the *flamen Dialis* and, as a subsequent perk to this position, had been betrothed to Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, as the high priest of Jupiter Optimus Maximus could not be married to any less than the daughter of a Consul. While such a union would undoubtedly furnish Caesar with an instant elevation in his standing, it was the remaining stipulations of the priesthood that promised little or any opportunity for advancement.<sup>15</sup>

The strict and regimented life of a *flamen Dialis* is well attested in Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Athenienses* and must have seemed strange even to the Romans who catalogued his restrictive lifestyle as a curiosity which they themselves did not fully understand.<sup>16</sup> The laundry list of taboos include the following: He may not ride a horse; see troops in

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<sup>12</sup> See Kahn; pgs. 39-48

<sup>13</sup> E.S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*; University of California Press; 1974 pg. 7

<sup>14</sup> Reference is here made to the consulship of 86 B.C.E. Broughton; *MRR V.II* 53

<sup>15</sup> M. Gelzer; Caesar pgs. 19-20. The former *flamen Dialis*, Lucius Cornelius Merula, committed suicide after he took up the consulship of Cinna after he had been deposed. Appian recalls the circumstances of the installation of Merula in *B.C. I*.65. See also Vell. 2.43 and 2.22

<sup>16</sup> See Gell. X.15 and his mention of Varro's *Divine Antiquities* in which Varro says of the *flamen Dialis*, "is solus album habet galerum, vel quod maximus est, vel quod Iovi immolata hostia alba fieri oporteat." The coordinating conjunction *vel quod...vel quod* show uncertainty as to the reason for the *flamen Dialis*' specific headgear.

sort of knot on his person; he may not touch raw flesh, ivy, or beans; he could not walk under vines; the foot of his bed must be covered in clay; no one else may sleep in this bed and he may not sleep out of this bed for more than three successive nights. These are but a few of the specific activities in which a *flamen Dialis* may not take part.<sup>17</sup> However, there are three prohibitions listed here that must certainly have been of no small concern to Caesar, namely those regarding the riding of horses, the witnessing of troops drawn up in formation, or leaving Rome for no more than two successive nights. Such prohibitions would have rendered the seeking of high office nearly impossible and would have led to the premature death of his career, for Gellius admits that, “for the aforementioned reasons rarely is the *flamen Dialis* made consul, since warfare is the mandate of the consul.”<sup>18</sup> It was at this time, with the impending ruin of his aspirations in sight, that fate smiled on the boy from the Subura.

His marriage to Cornelia came with all the pomp and circumstance accorded to the future *flamen Dialis*. Unlike most marriages of political expedience, which occurred frequently amongst the Roman aristocracy, this marriage brought with it a specific contract.<sup>19</sup> Whether Caesar saw the priesthood and the marriage as a boon or bust at the time can only be conjectured, for unknown to Caesar, the next couple of years would see

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<sup>17</sup> See C. Smith, “The Religion of Archaic Rome”; *Companion to Roman Religion*; Ed. J. Rüpke; Wiley-Blackwell Publishing; 2007 pg. 39. For a more complete discussion of the *flamen Dialis*, see C. Kerényi, *The Religion of the Greeks and the Romans*; E.P. Dutton and Co., New York; 1962 pgs. 219-235

<sup>18</sup> Gell. X.15 “...idcirco rarer flamen Dialis creatus consul est, cum bella consulibus mandabantur.” Here *rarer* must indicate that at some point, a *flamen Dialis* must have stood for the consulship and won. However, with the hindsight accorded to the modern observer, Caesar would not have been able to effect the change he did without his military command and his subsequent victories.

<sup>19</sup> Kahn; 52, Kerényi; 224-225, Gell. X.15.22-26. The wife of the *flamen Dialis* was a priestess herself known as the *flaminica* and the marriage between the two could not be dissolved except by death, in which case the surviving party abdicated their role as priest or priestess of Jupiter.



the death of Cinna and the return of Sulla. This radical shift in the political landscape would provide him with two important opportunities. Firstly, as the nephew of Marius and the son-in-law of Cinna, Caesar was poised to be the ultimate voice of the *Popularis* party. Secondly, as the son-in-law of Cinna, he was placed in direct conflict with Sulla, the newly self-declared dictator. The resulting confrontation, more than any other during his long career, would determine the shape of things to come and would give Caesar the opportunity to increase his fame with such speed and alacrity that his would be a household name before the close of the decade.

The legendary meeting between Sulla and Caesar would come to define politics for the remaining forty years of the Republic and would serve to solidify the drastic changes that had been coming to fruition over the last sixty years.<sup>20</sup> The game had changed and Sulla's new position and power was evidence enough. So Sulla, with the backing of newly minted precedent, held Rome with an iron fist. Such was the state of the eternal city when Caesar was summoned by Sulla.

It would be hard to believe that the young Caesar was completely ignorant as to the character of the meeting. Considering his family ties, it certainly could not be anything positive. Having arrived there, his fears were, no doubt, quickly realized and Caesar was

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<sup>20</sup> While many precedents had been set over the span of the seventy years since the tribunates of the Gracchi brothers, the four most important ones are these. First, both of the Gracchi brothers had been killed while exercising the office of the people's Tribune. According to Roman tradition and religion, there was no more gross violation of the law or profane sacrilege (see Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*; Macmillan and Co., London; 1901 pgs. 99-100 and Livy III.5 and Dion. VI. 89), yet no one was brought to trial or charged with their murders. With the murders of the Gracchi began the acceptance of wanton and open political violence, which once begun cannot be reigned in, much less stopped. This dangerous precedent was followed by the adoption of a new set of laws regarding the property qualifications for the Roman Army by Gaius Marius. In his reforms to the *Capita Censi*, Marius altered the property qualifications for service in the Roman army, thereby allowing a greater representative cross section of the populace into the army and swelling the badly depleted ranks (see C.A. Matthew, *On the Wings of Eagles: The Reforms of Gaius Marius and the Creation of Rome's First Professional Soldiers*; Cambridge Scholars Publishing; 2010 pgs. 20-22).

faced with a momentous choice. Either he would divorce his wife and annul the solemn contract of marriage, taken out in anticipation of becoming the next *flamen Dialis*, or forfeit his wife's considerable dowery, his family title and property, and the honor of being the chief priest of Jupiter.<sup>21</sup> Faced with such a daunting decision, Caesar did what he thought was best; he would not give up his *dignitas*.<sup>22</sup> His refusal to be swayed by the threat of so great a loss, which came so early in his career, clearly illustrates the nature of his character.<sup>23</sup> Consistency was a crucial skill for a Republican-era politician, and consistency in the face of almost certain death was defiance of an altogether different sort.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to the questions of moral right and dignity, there is one question that remains. Did Caesar see the priesthood as a stepping stone or a tombstone for his career?

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As a result, the Roman military became a heavily armed version of the *Comitia Centuriata*, fully capable of declaring their leader as imperator and giving unprecedented power to that man. With the changes to the military and the seemingly unintentional consequence of imbuing an armed body with that much political power, it would not take long for someone to recognize and to capitalize on the potential of this vast new power base. As it happened, Sulla was the first to march on Rome with an army under the standard in order to wrest control of the city from Gaius Marius. His army marched to the tune that would become familiar in all such pursuits, for they went into the city and more importantly past the *pomerium* in order to put down a 'tyrant' (A. Keaveney, *Sulla: The Last Republican*; Croom Helm, London; 1982 pgs. 120-121). The last step on this downward spiral of violence and bloodshed was the institutionalization of murder for hire, better known as the *proscriptio*. While this method for political control was first engineered by Marius and Cinna, it would be brought to its most awful realization with Sulla (K.S. Zachariä, *Lucius Cornelius Sulla*; Heidelberg; 1834 pgs. 142-146). In order to bolster a flagging economy and to gain favor amongst the wealthiest citizens, Sulla proscribed wealthy men who were opposed to him and once they had been killed, he confiscated their wealth and sold the land and property at reduced rates to his supporters. In this way, he was able to effectively kill two birds with one stone, by both getting rid of opponents and enticing confederates.

<sup>21</sup> Suet. *Iul.* I.1 and Plut. *Caes.* I.1. Suetonius and Plutarch differ on one crucial point in this episode. Suetonius describes a face-to-face meeting, while Plutarch merely describes Sulla's machinations against Caesar. I for one side with Suetonius' description of events as does Kahn; *Education* 58-59, Tatum; 30-31, and Meier; *Caesar* 92-93, and M. Gelzer; 20-21.

<sup>22</sup> B.C. I.9.1 "sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaeque potioem."

<sup>23</sup> Meier; 93

<sup>24</sup> *Comm. Pet.* XIV.54-55. "...esse unum hominem accommodatum ad tantam morum ac sermonum ac voluntatum varietatem. qua re etiam atque etiam perge tenere istam viam quam institisti..."

In addition to the questions of moral right and dignity, there is one question that remains. Did Caesar see the priesthood as a stepping stone or a tombstone for his career? Caesar's unflinching response to Sulla's demands may answer the question. In truth, Caesar had only one option if he wished to remain the son-in-law of Cinna, and therefore the heir apparent of the *Popularis* faction, and be free of the ridiculous limitations imposed by the office of the *flamen Dialis*. In denying Sulla his victory against his old nemesis Cinna, Caesar's victory was threefold. He was no longer weighed down by the prospect of a lifetime of obscurity on account of his priestly office, he remained married to the daughter of the *Popularis* leader, and he had struck a blow against Sulla for his slighted family.<sup>25</sup> However, for Caesar, the stakes were unbearably high. In denying Sulla during the height of the proscriptions, Caesar had guaranteed himself a death sentence.<sup>26</sup> As a result, he took to the road, pursued by Sulla's hatchet-men.

Caesar set out from the city in a condition less than suitable for travel. Suetonius and Plutarch tell us that he was afflicted by Malaria (*quartan ague*), while simultaneously evading Sulla's head hunters. During his lengthy flight from Sulla's wrath, it was those who remained at Rome who fought most ardently on his behalf. His mother, his uncle Mamercus Aemilius, and the entire troop of Vestal Virgins begged Sulla to spare Caesar.

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<sup>25</sup> Gelzer gets very close to the conclusion arrived at here, stopping just short of it by determining that Caesar might somehow miraculously be able to shed the priesthood, despite the fact that the last *flamen Dialis* that had merely substituted for a Consul was to be condemned to death and, in the end, committed suicide publicly (see. F.N. 7) (Gelzer; 21). Tatum acknowledges Caesar's move is an attempt to honor Marius and Cinna; however, he denies the existence of any hostility towards Sulla, citing his later marriage to Pompeia, the grand-daughter of Sulla, and his service in the Sullan military. Caesar's choices on these matters reveal nothing, as one should never confuse political expediency with a lack of enmity (Tatum; *Always Caesar* 31)

<sup>26</sup> This would not be the first time that Caesar put everything on the line to further his career and this high stakes political gambling would become a hallmark of Caesar's style.

ostensibly presaging the effect Caesar would have on the Republic.<sup>27</sup> Whatever effect this incident had in the shaping of things to come, it most certainly displays a very particular peculiarity of Roman politics. It seems that Sulla was only acting out of hatred for Cinna, not necessarily for Caesar himself. It turns out that Caesar was not denied a position in the military, which followed almost immediately on payment of his bail/bribe.

And so, having been freed from the constant pursuit which had plagued him, Caesar signed on as an aide-de-campe for the praetor Marcus Minucius Thermus.<sup>28</sup> It was during his time as aide to the praetor that he both proved his worth as a diplomat and as a soldier. This twist of fate is fascinating, owing to the fact that Marcus Thermus was a known Sullan adherent.<sup>29</sup> Caesar's ability to return instantly to the fold was more a product of the duration of foreign and domestic warfare than anything else. An officer was an officer, even an untested one, and despite the effectiveness of the Marian martial reforms in recruiting men to the rank and file, the costly Social Wars and the First Mithradatic War combined with the proscriptions of Sulla to weaken the general strength of the army

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<sup>27</sup> Suet. *Iul.* I.1 and Plut. *Caes.* I.1. Given the situation at the beginning of this episode, one is forced to wonder why Sulla made the forfeiture of the priesthood a pivotal part of the deal. If Sulla really intended to sideline Caesar's political career then and there, it would have made more sense if he instated Caesar's priesthood. After even a cursory examination, two possibilities immediately become clear: Either Sulla was not able to see that the office of *flamen Dialis* would be a great hinderance to Caesar's political career, or he was so possessed by his desire to snub Cinna, who set up the office in the first place, that he disregarded the opportunity to end Caesar's career just to give Cinna one more poke in the eye.

<sup>28</sup> I am purposefully skipping over Plutarch's account of Caesar's capture by pirates. The chronology given by Plutarch does not bear scrutiny, since Caesar was proscribed by Sulla in 82 and Marcus Minucius Thermus was Praetor in 81 (Broughton; *MRR*:V.II 76). There was not enough time for Caesar to have sailed to Rhodes to be instructed by Apollonius, move north to the province of Asia, enlist with Thermus, and thus to be present at the Battle of Mytilene in 79. It is even less likely that he would have had the time to be waylaid by Pirates for forty days and still have been able to complete such a task in a little over a year. See Gelzer; 21

<sup>29</sup>Tatum; *Always Caesar* 31

both amongst the officers and the enlisted men.<sup>30</sup> On top of all this, the memory of their defeat at the hands of Mithradates VI was still an open wound.<sup>31</sup> To this end, Lucius Licinius Lucullus moved to the province of Asia to push Mithradates out in 83 B.C.E.

By the time Caesar arrived in Asia in 81, the war was winding down and soon the mop-up operations began, seeking out the pirate forces still in Asia who retained their loyalty to Mithradates VI.<sup>32</sup> The first task given to the young *contubernio* was to seek the aid of King Nicomedes of Bithynia in acquiring a fleet to sail against the pirate enclaves still operating out of Cilician ports. Suetonius reports that Caesar left with the specific mission of securing the use of the Bithynian fleet and that he was gone so long that rumors began to spread of an unseemly relationship between Caesar and Nicomedes.<sup>33</sup> Whether this relationship actually happened is inconsequential when compared with the explanation that Caesar gave for rumors surrounding his second absence.

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<sup>30</sup> Most soldiers who had enlisted prior to the Social Wars and the first Mithradatic War would have either been dead or would have been in the army for an excessive period of time. Seeing the hardships of these men, it is quite plausible that the initial boost to army enlistment that was caused by the Marian reforms had dropped off considerably during this time of ceaseless conflict.

<sup>31</sup> Mithradatis VI had been highly successful in his initial conflict with Rome from 89-85 B.C.E. Not only did he effectively route the armies of Sulla and Luculus early in the conflict but prior to this victory, he ordered a general purge of Roman citizens in the province of Asia. See App. *Mith.* 4.22 and M. Rostovtzeff, "Mithridates Advance in Asia Minor and Greece"; *The Cambridge Ancient History*; V.9 (1951) pg. 243. Here, Rostovtzeff's work is preferable to the more recent edition.

<sup>32</sup> Mithridates had used the Cilician pirates as privateers during his conflicts with the Romans. Privateering was extremely useful in this type of campaign, as it kept the Romans from receiving a steady stream of supplies and reinforcements to the battlefield in Asia. See P. de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World*; Cambridge University Press; 1999 pgs. 125-128

<sup>33</sup> Suet. *Iul.* I.2. "a quo [Thermus] ad accersendam classem in Bithyniam missus desedit apud Nicomeden. non sine rumore prostratae regi pudicitiae;" This rumor would become so famous that at one of Caesar's triumphs, his soldiers recounted the story in a bawdy chant. "Bithynia quicquid et predicator Caesaris umquam habuit." Suet. *Iul.* I.49

“...which rumor he aided by returning in a very few days to Bythynia, for the sake of retrieving monies which were owed to a certain one of his freedman clients.”<sup>34</sup>

The truth of the matter is that Caesar most likely spent the majority of his time at the court of Nicomedes in securing client relationships in Bithynia.<sup>35</sup> This being the most likely case, it is indeed exceptional that Caesar would go out of his way to help a freeman who was his client to exact monies owed to him.<sup>36</sup> This kind of commitment to his clients would continue throughout his political career and would come to be expected from him. This expectation led many to seek his patronage, which allowed him to easily sway the vote of the people and to achieve a rarely seen level of loyalty and popularity with his troops.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Suet. *Iul.* I.2. Unfortunately, a great many translations of this passage intimate that Suetonius gave credence to the rumor. Here Suetonius says nothing of the rumor's truth nor of his belief in it, only stating that “[Caesar] aided the rumor [by] returning in a few days to Bythynia...”(quem rumorem auxit intra paucos rursus dies repetita Bithynia). For example of this, see J.C. Rolfe's translation in LCL.

<sup>35</sup> T.J. Luce, “Marius and the Mithradatic Command”; *Historia*; V.19 (1970) pgs. 167-168 and E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*; Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1958 pgs. 203-205. It is highly probable that Marius spent his time gathering clients to himself during his inspection tour of the province of Asia. Despite the lack of direct evidence on this point, Luce and Badian both concede that it was likely that Marius intended to secure the eastern command if war broke out between with Mithradates. If this is the case, the “inspection tour” of Marius may have in fact served as a reconnoitering of the East and as such would have been used as an opportunity to entice various kingdoms to support the cause of Rome. The supply problems of the First Mithradatic War would have been solved by supporting client kingdoms against Mithradates in return for a steady flow of supplies during the war. Whatever the case, it seems that Caesar is taking a good deal of time to devote himself to clients that he most likely secured as sole heir and nephew of Marius. Further evidence will be considered later in this chapter as it relates to Caesar's prosecution of C. Dolabella for *repetundae* on behalf of the Greek citizens of Asia.

<sup>36</sup> Suet. *Iul.* I.2. c.f. Meier; 131. Meier's intention to prove that Caesar was an outsider trumps all of the evidence to the contrary. In this particular instance, Caesar shows himself to be more “Roman” than any of his counterparts. If we accept Meier's argument of the outsider, then it is clear we must understand that Caesar's position as an outsider arose from an unflinching and inalienable desire to be more traditional than anyone else.

<sup>37</sup> See Z. Yavetz, *Plebs and Princes*; Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1969 pgs. 48-52. c.f. F. Millar, “The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic”; *JRS*; V.74 (1984) pgs. 1-19. Millar insists that it was not clientage but the regularity of office holding by direct relations that determined the likelihood of obtaining office. Unfortunately, Millar does not follow his conclusion to its logical end. The longer a single family has been in office, the longer that family has had to accrue clients; therefore, the client base correlates directly with the regularity of office holding. See also D.H. II.10.1-4 and XI.1-2 for summary and history of Patron-Client relationship.

The second great windfall for Caesar came in 79 while still an aide to Municius Thermus at the battle of Mytilene.<sup>38</sup> The information regarding the siege of Mytilene on Lesbos is scanty at best and it is quite possible that the only reason it is known today is directly related to Caesar's winning of the *corona civica* due to his actions during the battle.

Whatever might have occurred during the battle, it is clear that Caesar won the *corona civica*. This high honor draws its roots from the very beginning of Roman culture and according to Pliny the Elder, it was Romulus who first accorded this honor to a citizen.<sup>39</sup> The crown was awarded by the commanding officer of the recipient for very specific actions in battle which revolved around saving the life of a fellow citizen and are as follows:

“[The recipient] must save a citizen and destroy the enemy; the ground on which the action took place must have been occupied by the enemy on that same day. The citizen who was saved must confess to it for—no other testimony is useful—and he must swear that he is indeed a citizen.”<sup>40</sup>

Having satisfied these requirements, the award was given, along with several bonuses. Recipients were allowed to wear both the crown and robes of honor on special occasions. They were allowed to sit in the front of the theater and games. In addition to

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<sup>38</sup> “Mytilene”; *OCD*; 3rd. Ed.; Oxford University Press; 2002 pg. 1100. There seems to be a great deal of confusion in the Ancient Sources as to when this battle took place. Plutarch places the siege of Mytilene somewhere towards the end of Sulla's time in the east, placing its occurrence during the Generalship of Lucius Licinius Lucullus circa 84. This obviously does not line up with the 79 conflict described in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. It is unclear whether two sieges took place or if the sources are recounting the same event. See Plut. *Luc.* 4. de Souza; *Piracy* 123. De Souza agrees that the incident described by Plutarch in *Luc.* 4 must be the siege and capture described in Suetonius, Aurelius Victor, and the MRR (see F.N. 129)

<sup>39</sup> Plin. *N.H.* XVI.5

<sup>40</sup> Plin. *N.H.* XVI.5. “civem servare, hostem occidere, utque eum locum, in quo sit actum, hostis optineat eo die, ut servatus fateatur- alias testes nihil posunt- , ut civis fuerit.” See also Poly. VI.39

this, men of all classes were to stand up when they entered.<sup>41</sup> By earning this great honor Caesar had effectively regained all the honors that would have been accorded him as the chief priest of Jupiter without any of the problematic rules that went along with it. In less than three years from the time of his flight to the end of the siege at Mytilene, he had effectively turned a corner in his career and, upon the death of Sulla, immediately returned to Rome in a bid to make use of the reputation that he had made for himself by prosecuting two men who had used their connection with Sulla to plunder Asia.

The record regarding Caesar's return to Rome after his military service is less than concrete. For Suetonius, the clear motivation for Caesar to return to Rome with such speed hinged upon an invitation made by Marcus Lepidus to join in a conspiracy against the Sullan supporters still firmly entrenched in the Senate. Those whose families had been proscribed, their lands seized, and their names ruined followed new leaders that had risen up to demand justice for the dispossessed. Suetonius tells us that it was Marcus Aemilius Lepidus who approached Caesar with regards to making a pact to support his actions. Suetonius' recording of the events is somewhat cryptic, although he does clearly state that Caesar had no confidence in whatever Lepidus had planned and turned his attentions toward milder means of reform.<sup>42</sup>

Caesar's choice to prosecute Cn. Dolabella on a charge of extortion rather than join Lepidus in his half-cocked revolt was another game changer. Instead of fighting for the

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<sup>41</sup> Plin. *N.H.* XVI.13 and B. Bergmann, Der Kranz des Kaisers: Genese und Bedeutung einer römischen Insignie; De Gruyter, Berlin; 2010 pgs. 135-136

<sup>42</sup> Suet. *Iul.* I.3. The conspiracy of Lepidus is not mentioned in Plutarch. See Gruen; Last Generation 11. Gruen makes a case for Caesar's decision not to back the open rebellion of Lepidus and instead to take up the prosecution of Cn. Dolabella.



dispossessed of Rome directly, Caesar first chose to back the clients that he had recently secured in the province of Asia and to expose the criminal enterprises of an ex-consul with distinctly Sullan leanings. The beauty of this arrangement was that he did not necessarily need to secure a conviction in order to be victorious. Whether Dolabella was acquitted or not, the highly public nature of a trial would allow him to air the dirty laundry of the Sullans before the entire city without necessarily arousing them to any outright or violent action.<sup>43</sup>

Political battles in the courts were a time-honored tradition in the Roman Republic and were not related to any sort of partisan notions. According to Gruen, even firmly entrenched members of the Sullan government took each other to court simply to gain an advantage over their confederates.<sup>44</sup> For Caesar, it was also an opportunity to make an instant name for himself as a lawyer and to further the reputation that was surely by this time well known to the whole city; he was the man who defied Sulla and lived. This defiance was carried even further when, in 76, he went to the province of Asia to bring charges against Cn. Antonius for almost exactly the same thing as Dolabella. Again Antonius was acquitted, however this time by a much slimmer margin. This is evidenced by Antonius' motion for a change of venue after he insisted that he could not receive a fair trial in Greece.<sup>45</sup> These early prosecutions allowed Caesar to demonstrate both his

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<sup>43</sup> See E.S. Gruen, "The Dolabellae and Sulla"; *AJPhil.* V. 87 (1966) pgs. 389-399 for an expanded account of the connections between the Dolabellae and Sulla.

<sup>44</sup> Gruen; *Last Generation* 11-12 and E.S. Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149-78 B.C.; Harvard University Press; 1968 pgs. 6-7

<sup>45</sup> Plut. *Caes.* I.4. See also C. Damon and C.S. Mackay, "On the Prosecution of C. Antonius in 76 B.C."; *Historia*; V.44 (1995) pgs. 37-55 for a comprehensive look at the trial. This instance is also mentioned in the *Commentariolum Petitionis* 2.8

legal acumen and his loyalty to his clients, especially since Caesar himself stood as their council, a duty which was regularly performed by a patron in former generations. His fidelity to the cause of the Patron-Client relationship would be the founding principle of his political career and there is little doubt that his fealty to his clients was a great instrument for the furthering of his client base. Caesar, having thoroughly tested the waters of post-Sullan Rome and having rattled the cages of some very preeminent men, left Rome. Sailing to Rhodes, he continued his education with Apollonius, a master of rhetorical speech.

In truth, Caesar's loyalty and fidelity were his two most effective campaigning tools. Throughout his formative years, every action he performed was in keeping with this tradition. However, it would be a mistake to neglect the fact that somehow he was able to hold to this high standard and at the same time to achieve his desired ends. He did not divorce Cornelia when cornered by Sulla and by denying him increased his reputation, allowing him to continue on as Cinna's son-in-law, and he remained the heir of the *Popularis* party. All of this he valued more highly than the small fortune he stood to gain through Cornelia's dowry or the ascension to a priesthood that might have given him short-term honor but would have eventually proved an almost insurmountable stumbling block. His first foreign campaign netted him the Civic Crown, a distinction that not only bespoke his martial prowess but also showed that he would risk his life to save a fellow citizen. His return to Rome was no less remarkable and certainly no less advantageous. He chose not to follow Lepidus, and instead he brought men to trial for being lesser men than he. Lepidus and Sertorius fell victim to their scheming while Caesar effected all that

he desired, despite the fact that he did not win either case. The former lost everything, the latter made his point with no possibility of losing. Caesar was able, during the course of a few short years, through his adherence to the philosophy of loyalty, fidelity, and constancy to ennoble his family name, to gain back all that men attempted to take from him, and to carve a sizable niche for himself in the Republic. The *Commentariolum* reminds the campaigner that he must chose some facet of his reputation and stick to it, “...whatever you are from this, you are.”<sup>46</sup> Caesar would follow this maxim to the end.

### **Setting the Stage**

With Caesar safely on Rhodes, it is time to take up a subject which is unparalleled in importance. In order to understand Roman politics and the campaigning process, it is crucial to understand not only how they did it but where they did it. The modern Republican process is full of closed doors, hushed voices, and muffled whispers. For the Romans this directly defied the very meaning of *Res Publica*. The “public thing” was just that, a public thing. Romans were treated almost daily to a theatrical presentation of Roman politics on the stage of the Forum. Everything from court cases to debates to executions happened in full public view.<sup>47</sup> As with any aspect of politics, the need to manipulate and in some sense to orchestrate the comings and goings of citizens within

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<sup>46</sup> *Comm. Pet. I.1.2*

<sup>47</sup> F. Millar, *The Crowd in Rome and the Late Republic*; University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor; 1998 pgs. 38-48 and I. Östenberg, “Power Walks: Aristocratic Escorted Movements in Republican Rome”; *Moving City: Processions, Passages and Promenades*; Bloomsbury Publishing; 2015 pg. 16

this space was of paramount concern to the governing body.<sup>48</sup> For this reason, the Forum developed into the center for governance and law that it was during the time of Caesar; however, it had not always been this way.

The Forum Magnum lies at the base of the Capitoline hill and is situated where the confluence of streams flowed out of the hills of Rome. This natural phenomenon was perfectly suited to house a central market area amidst the three hills that were inhabited in remotest antiquity. The first evidence we have regarding the early development of the Forum comes from archeology and places the first paving and monument at the site from 650 B.C.E to 575 B.C.E, presumably during the reign of the Etruscan King, Tullius Hostilius, which also coincides with the first Senate house built on that spot, the Curia Hostilia.<sup>49</sup>

The Forum got its next facelift from the Tarquins who channeled the various streams that ran off the hills into the Cloaca Maxima. With the Forum now fully drained, there began to be a concerted building effort which included the building of shops, taverns, temples, and a general expansion of the road network that fed into and out of the Forum. Interestingly enough, the roads were directly linked to the streams that flowed out of the hills.<sup>50</sup> Further expansion of the system of roads after the 4th century B.C.E. created a

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<sup>48</sup> A. Yakobson, "Traditional Political Culture and the People's Role in the Roman Republic"; *Historia*; V.59 (2010) pgs. 284-285 and Millar, *Crowd* 9-12. While Yakobson is correct in doubting Millar's "Democratic" view, he misses the fact that the relationship was a codependent one. It is quite ridiculous to think that the ruling class went to all the trouble to speak publicly if they weren't interested in getting the public behind them, or if they felt no pressing need to do so.

<sup>49</sup> Livy I.30 and J.E. Stambaugh, *The Ancient Roman City*; Harvard University Press; 1988 pg. 14. The fact that the Forum Magnum was paved expressly for the construction of a senate house is very telling, especially considering the place it was to hold in Rome in the future on account of it.

<sup>50</sup> L. Richardson, *A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*; Johns-Hopkins University Press; 1992 pg. 170. See Livy I.35.10, I.38.6 and I.56.2. See also Dion. Hal. 3.67.4

network of pathways that connected nearly every part of the city to the Forum and by creating these pathways, the Romans had made the Forum into the main transit hub of the city.<sup>51</sup>

There would be further changes to the Forum through the intervening years, including a general change from marketplace to a governmental and commercial center with the influx of bankers and financiers into the storefronts that once housed the shops and taverns and the movement of the Comitium into the Forum by C. Licinius Crassus in 145.<sup>52</sup> By doing this, Licinius Crassus had taken the final step towards making the Forum the center of the entire city and was lauded as such by Cicero seventy years later.

“[The Forum is] the temple of sanctity, of greatness, the soul of the city, the place of public councils, the head of the city, the alter of comrades, the entryway for all peoples, the seat from which the whole populous departs as one order...”<sup>53</sup>

Cicero’s quote is made even more interesting by his description of the Forum as a place which all people enter and all people leave as one. His description is a tantalizing clue as to how the Forum actually functioned.

Hilliard and Hansen, in their seminal work The Social Logic of Space, correctly theorized that all human settlements follow two fundamentals of organization: space and transit. In this way, all habitation is broken down into its constituent parts and two questions were answered: Where am I going and how do I get there?<sup>54</sup> Cities, by their

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<sup>51</sup> See Richardson; 171 for a thorough explanation of the development of the Forum hub.

<sup>52</sup> See Cic. *Amic.* 96 and Varro *Rust.* 1.2.9.

<sup>53</sup> Cic. *Mil.* 90. “templum sanctitatis, amplitudinis, mentis, consuli publici, caput urbis, aram sociorum, portum omnium gentium, sedem ab universo populo concessam uni ordini...” Cicero’s description of the figurative coming and going of citizens in the Forum mirrors the factual daily operation of the Forum.

<sup>54</sup> Hilliard and Hansen, The Social Logic of Space; Cambridge University Press; 1984 pgs. 14-18

very nature, are places of dense settlement patterns and in turn, it follows that the greater the population, the more space that is required for the myriad daily activities that this population might engage in. The trouble with the theory is that it is used to explain the significance or functionality of this or that space and while these questions may be entertaining, they often border on being irrelevant. Rarely, if ever, is it used to tackle the more important question of how so many people managed to get to that space and use it for its intended purpose. In light of this, the Forum becomes the perfect laboratory test for spaces that function simultaneously as transits.

The Forum, as described above, was truly the confluence of the whole city, the “entryway” and the “passage” of large numbers of people. Scholars have spent a great deal of time tackling the problem of how so many people used a space not much bigger than a modern day football field to perform so many activities. The Forum acted as the seat of government, the major law court, and the business center, housing such varied concerns as offices, shops, banks, temples, and museums. The only way to adequately explain this is to see the Forum as a transit hub. Roman citizens filtered in and out of the Forum constantly, creating a traffic pattern not unlike a modern-day round about. This concept is best understood through a simple thought experiment: Imagine that all of Parliament, the Law Courts, and the high streets shopping district were all convened outside and placed on the center of the Trafalgar Square. Such a situation would not be dissimilar to the daily operation of the Forum.

Looking at the Forum in this way, it is not only possible to understand how it worked but why it was such a crucial place for politicians to capitalize on. For example, the

necessity for a politician to be skilled in oratory becomes abundantly clear. If a politician, by virtue of his oratory, was able to stop this flow of people for only a few moments, the entire city center would creep to a standstill. Furthermore, just as the modern day driver contemplates the cause of a traffic jam, so to would their Roman counterpart. This phenomena also accounts for the unexplainable speed with which rumors flew around the city. Even if the crowd was not within earshot of the speaker himself, it is rather likely that word of mouth amongst the crowd would have been sufficient to carry the main points of his message. The same effect would most likely be seen at gladiatorial games, exhibitions, and other activities in the Forum. There is certainly no cause to wonder why Julius Caesar took such a keen interest in these types of affairs in the Forum, and why he spent so much time and money in expanding the Forum without moving it from its location.<sup>55</sup> It was the Forum's position as a major hub for nearly every endeavor carried out within the city, including merely traveling across town, that ensured the Forum was not only packed with loafers and undesirables as certain sources would have us believe.<sup>56</sup> It is certainly reasonable to assume, given this state of affairs, that a majority of the populous of Rome would find themselves, at some point during the day, passing through the Forum.

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<sup>55</sup> For Pompey's and Caesar's differing plans and ideologies surrounding public projects, see Stambaugh; 41-45.

<sup>56</sup> Pliny, *N.H.* IX.24 and Plaut. *Curc.* 470-483. See also Richardson; 172 and Stambaugh; 111-112

## **The Strategy**

The basic strategy of the political hopeful has not changed much since republics and democracies first graced the earth. Even in the days of the Late-Republic, the basic plan still included kissing a lot of babies and stealing a lot of lollipops. However, the Roman voter, just like any other voter in history, had a list of criteria to select a suitable candidate unique to their time, place, and culture. Fortunately, such a manual exists from around the time of the Late-Republic or Early Empire which can shed light on what politicians did to curry favor with the voting populace: The *Commentariolum Petitionis*. While there will be a translation and an extended commentary on the particulars of this textual evidence in the appendices of this work, it is critical to establish the importance of utilizing this document in a discussion of Caesar's career.

This first chapter is dedicated to understanding the three most basic tenets of a successful career in politics: first, the necessity of cultivating a reputation amongst the voting populace; second, understanding the topography of politics in a society which conducted its business in full public view; and finally, to understand the strategies by which the first two tenets were used to secure election. There also remains one last factor that, to my knowledge, has never been fully addressed. The *Commentariolum* has been used expressly to debate the specific act of petitioning. That is the intent of the document to be sure; however, consideration needs to be made regarding the longevity of what might be deemed the "petitioning period." This does not merely include the year prior to the campaign or the year of the campaign itself.<sup>57</sup> From entry into office, a politician would spend the remainder of his life following

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<sup>57</sup> L.R. Taylor, *Roman Voting Assemblies*; University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor; 1966 pg. 1. Here Taylor describes the constancy of the campaigning process in Rome.



the guidelines set forth in the *Commentariolum*, if he desired to continue in power.<sup>58</sup> In light of this, the *Commentariolum* can be used not only to examine the period of the actual act of petitioning but can, in fact, be used to study the width and breadth of an entire career in politics.

### **The Return**

Having completed his studies with Apollonius on Rhodes, Caesar returned to Rome. The city had begun to shake off the the chains of the Sullan constitution and the enclave of Sullan conservatives was swiftly evaporating. When Caesar left for Rhodes after the trial of Cn. Antonius, there was a growing movement to reinstate the powers of the people's Tribunes. Even Pompey and Crassus, who had been elevated by the Sullan reforms and vastly enriched by the proscriptions, took it in hand to embrace popular reform during their joint consulship in Rome in 71-70.<sup>59</sup> Caesar stepped off the boat in 72 ready to petition the votes of a citizenry ready for change.

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<sup>58</sup> Power here does not necessarily refer to office. Even those who have earned the coveted office of Censor will still act on the principles expounded in the *Commentariolum*.

<sup>59</sup> Broughton; *MRR* V.II 126

## THE MILITARY TRIBUNATE AND THE QUAESTORSHIP

### **The Military Tribune**

“The office of Military Tribune,” records Suetonius, “[was] the first honor bestowed upon him through the vote of the people upon his return...”<sup>60</sup> The office of Military Tribune was by far the most antiquated and, during Caesar’s time, the most disused rung on the *cursus honorum*, as young senatorial men were much less interested in a military career as in centuries past.<sup>61</sup> Even so, Caesar sought this office out. A key to understanding why he chose to petition for this office can be found in the duties and obligations of the office itself.

The Military Tribune was an institution unto itself, expressly designed to teach youthful consular hopefuls how to maintain an army in the field. The Military Tribune was responsible for everything that involved the upkeep of the army, including the procurement of food, clothing, and arms, and the conducting of exercise, drilling, and martial discipline. There were six Tribunes per legion; the six who were to serve in the first legion were voted into office by the people. Chosen to head this group of six was usually a patrician; the remainder of the positions were usually filled by equites.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 5 and Plut. *Caes.* 5.1

<sup>61</sup> J. Suolahti, The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period: A Study on Social Structure; Helsinki; 1955 pg.24

<sup>62</sup> Suolahti; 43-59. See also *OCD*; “Military Tribune” 1549

Looking back with 20/20 hindsight, it is easy to understand the effect this crash course in quarter mastery had for the Caesar who would one day conquer Gaul; however, his choice to serve yet again in the army, rather than to run for the office of Quaestor directly, is an interesting one. It immediately conjures images of a self-assured Caesar who had miraculously planned out his entire life in advance, who knew that this experience would come in handy later. Setting aside this absurd notion, there is evidence in the *Commentariolum* as to his motivation for choosing to take up the office of Military Tribune, “Whatever you are, from this you are...”<sup>63</sup>; in Caesar’s case, he was a winner of the Civic Crown and his reputation for martial valor was something he would rely on time and time again during his career. This first move was clearly an attempt to solidify his image and reputation as a dependable and competent warrior.<sup>64</sup> As luck (or foresight) would have it, this choice would also place him in an excellent position to curry favor with the men who would come to be an integral part of his future plans: Cn. Pompeius and M. Licinius Crassus.

Pompey and Crassus had embarked on the consulship of 70 with the avowed intention of returning the tribunician powers which Sulla had removed during his dictatorship. Interestingly enough, the attempts to return these powers to the People’s Tribune had begun almost immediately after Caesar had left for Rhodes in 76/75. A string of Plebeian

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<sup>63</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 1.2 (see pg. 16).

<sup>64</sup> Gelzer; *Caesar* 31. See also Plut. *Caes.* 3.2 “πρὸς ὅπερ ἡ φύσις ὑφηγεῖτο τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν δεινότητος, ὑπὸ στρατειῶν καὶ πολιτείας, ἣ κατεκτήσατο τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, οὐκ ἐξικόμενος.” Plutarch echoes the *Commentariolum* in stating that Caesar’s choice to rejoin the army as Military Tribune was a function of his “Nature”. According to Plutarch, Caesar could have been the first in his class in rhetoric but that he made a conscious decision to embrace martial valor and statecraft (στρατειῶν καὶ πολιτείας) as his most important abilities.

Tribunes had made attempts at reinstating the powers but to no avail.<sup>65</sup> It was not until Pompey and Crassus were made Consuls that the full power was returned.<sup>66</sup>

Suetonius points out that Caesar played an active albeit minor role in restoring Tribunician power and his actions here require an investigation of exactly why he would do this.<sup>67</sup> Firstly, according to the *Commentariolum*, the heads of the tribes and the tribunes themselves were of singular importance to the politician both during the petitioning period and for maintaining power afterwards.<sup>68</sup> Secondly, the specific powers of the tribunes that Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar were seeking to reinstate must be considered. The first issue is self-evident, but the second requires specific attention.

For all intents and purposes, the office of People's Tribune had been effectively castrated during the dictatorship of Sulla. The most important powers its holders wielded prior to Sulla's reign were the ability to veto legislation brought forward in the Senate and the ability to bring laws before the *Comitia*, which could be voted on directly by the people and thereby passed directly into law.<sup>69</sup> It is easy to see how these powers would stop or severely curtail Sulla's ability to reform the constitution. The sources do not recount how this was achieved or to what extent the power of veto was suppressed. The

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<sup>65</sup> Gruen; *Last Generation* pgs. 23-28.

<sup>66</sup> Pompey and Crassus' most important legislation during their joint consulship was the return of full Tribunician powers and the return of juridical powers to the equites. According to Cicero, the return of these powers was being sought by the populace at large. See Cic. *Div. in Caec.* 7. According to Kahn, the return of these judicial powers was the chief reason for Cicero to have prosecuted Varro in the first place. The Second reason, of course, was to attach himself to Pompey. See Kahn; *Education* 99 and *Comm. Pet.* 5.

<sup>67</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 5

<sup>68</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 5.18

<sup>69</sup> See Lintott; *Constitution of the Roman Republic*; Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1999 pgs. 121-128 and Greenidge; *Public Life* 93-97.

cessation of the tribune's legislative powers is much easier to track down. Sulla's measure of 81 made it illegal to propose legislation in the *Comitia Centuriata* and the *Comitia tributa* without senatorial approval.<sup>70</sup> In this way, Sulla made it extremely difficult to pass any popular measures in the senate and as a result, he had handed over an inordinate amount of power to the Senate and the aristocracy.<sup>71</sup> The loss of these powers also served to strip the power of the heads of the *Comitia Tributa*. The traditional role that they had played for candidates and politicians, plebeian and patrician alike, was gone. Without an alternate venue in which to propose laws and without free and unimpeded tribunes to propose them, reform minded politicians were doomed to failure.<sup>72</sup> Added to this was the best perk of all. In handing the tribunes back their power, they also served to empower the Tribal heads which, as is attested by the *Commentariolum*, could swing the vote amongst the tribes.<sup>73</sup> There is no doubt that this was first and foremost in the mind of Caesar.

For Caesar, this situation created the perfect way to make a place for himself in the circle of Pompey and Crassus. If Caesar was able to tap into the reputation of Pompey

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<sup>70</sup> For sources on Sulla's Tribune reforms, see Broughton; *MRR* II.75. See also Gruen; *Last Generation* 8-10 and Keaveney; *Last Republican* 169-170 for a sympathetic view of Sulla's reforms.

<sup>71</sup> c.f. Gruen; *Last Generation* pg. 24. Here Gruen argues that the People's Tribune had always been an arm of the aristocracy and subject to their control, yet if this was the case, why had Sulla made the office of tribune a political dead end, thereby deterring people from even desiring to fill its ranks? The argument made by Gruen that this move was made out of the fear of people like the Gracchii, Glaucia, and Saturninus serves only to prove that his contention concerning the Tribunes as aristocratic lap dogs was changing.

<sup>72</sup> One must ask at this point what two old Sullan supporters were doing championing alterations of the Sullan constitution and what had changed in the political landscape of Rome to entice them toward such actions. The only practicable links between the two men and their younger confederate were command positions during the Servile War. Furthermore, Caesar's position as military tribune would have placed him on Pompey's staff one year prior to Pompey and Crassus' consulship. See Gelzer; *Caesar* 30-31.

<sup>73</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 5.18. According to the *Commentariolum*, the Tribal Heads were able, through their backing of a candidate, to secure the backing of the entire tribe.

and the vast riches of Crassus, he would most certainly have a leg up on any competitor that might come his way. The *Commentariolum* states that the only supporters more crucial to political success than the Tribunes and the heads of the *Comitia Tributa* were men of ex-consular rank.<sup>74</sup> Pompey and Crassus were such men, fresh from victory in the Spartacan Rebellion, at the zenith of their respective careers, and almost completely at odds with one another. It is impossible to say how great a hand Caesar had in the building of the subsequent *Popularis* program.<sup>75</sup> However, if he were merely an observer, it seems oddly self-serving that the first of these projects was to gain general amnesty for the remaining Sertorian conspirators who were still alive; the most important of these for Caesar was the brother of his wife, L. Cinna.<sup>76</sup>

Caesar's decision to leave Lepidus and Sertorius to their own devices was one of the most brilliant in his early career. Whether it was luck or insight cannot be argued; however, it is clear that he would have lost everything, as his brother-in-law had, had he decided to side with them. Instead the end of Sertorius gave Caesar an opportunity to try out a tactic that would become yet another one of his trademark moves.

Caesar participated in the call, not only for a general amnesty, but for the conspirators to be allowed to return to Rome as citizens.<sup>77</sup> On the surface it appears that L. Cinna, his brother-in-law, was the obvious benefactor. The immediate conclusion is that Caesar was

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<sup>74</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 5.18

<sup>75</sup> The *Commentariolum* contains a number of passages regarding the giving and receiving of *Gratias*. While this word most often equates in English to "thanks", in this case, the *Commentariolum* makes it very clear that *Gratias* in the political world had much more in common with a tradable commodity, even implying that whoever you have helped may be honor bound to help you in return. See Chapter 3 and Appendix.

<sup>76</sup> Broughton; *MRR V.II* 128

<sup>77</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 5.

merely looking out for the honor and the interest of his family and it would have certainly appeared this way to the general public. However, upon closer inspection, Caesar's true goal becomes abundantly clear. By extending the hand of forgiveness (*clementia*) to his brother-in-law, he is seen to be merciful and by being merciful he was also displaying his status as the *Pater Familias* for both the Julii and the Cinnae.<sup>78</sup> In one rather adroit move, he secured his status as head of the most powerful *Popularis* families in the republic and ensured the allegiance of not only the family, its dependents, and slaves but, more importantly, he was now well placed to act as a patron to the clients of four major patrician households.<sup>79</sup>

All of these gains were couched in the true goal of this venture. After successfully lobbying for the return of the Tribunician powers, a test was made to determine what reaction, if any, the *Optimates* might have to this new, intensely Anti-Sullan legislation. To this end, the Tribune Plautius was selected to convey legal reforms to the *Comitia* directly. Plautius introduced legislation on behalf of Caesar to recall the remaining

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<sup>78</sup> Gel. XIII.3-5. The evidence of this is obtained rather obliquely through A. Gellius' musings on grammar, and as a result, a rare snippet of an actual speech given by Caesar is recorded. "Repperi tamen in oratione C. Caesaris, *Qua Plautian Rogatitonem Suasit*, 'necessitatem' dictam pro 'necessitudine,' id est iure adfinitatis. Verba haec sunt: "Equidem mihi videor pro nostra necessitate non labore, non opera, non industria defuisse." Here "necessitate" according to Gellius refers to dependents related by kinship, "adfinitis familiaritatisque coniuncti sunt 'necessarii' dicuntur." I would argue that *pro nostra necessitate* in Caesar's reported speech combines the concept of necessity (*pietas* and *fides*) and kinship ties, as does A. Kahn. See Kahn; *Education* 99. See also A. Hus, *Greek and Roman Religion*; Hawthorne Books, New York; 1962 pgs. 118-119 for *pietas* and *fides* as the "foundation of secular ethics."

<sup>79</sup> Caesar now holds the clients of the Marcii Reges from Marius after the death of his only son, the clients of the Julii and the lesser families of the Metelli from his mother, and father and now the clients of the Cornelii Cinnae. Such a vast holding of clientage would have no doubt rivaled and surpassed some of the larger and older families in the city. See Comm. Pet. 5.17 for the importance of friends, family, and servants to the prospective politician.

followers of Lepidus and Sertorius in exile.<sup>80</sup> The connection between the reinstatement of Tribunician powers and the beginning of reform measures cannot be underestimated, nor can Caesar's part in all of it.<sup>81</sup> Caesar's time as Military Tribune was used to cultivate many friends and clients from all levels of society<sup>82</sup> and to further his reputation as a competent commander. He was able to help strike the death nell of the Sullan constitution, and to be seen doing so publicly.<sup>83</sup> His decision to join Pompey and Crassus, and to be the tie that bound them together as they sought to outdo each other at every turn, would prove to be a most fortuitous one.<sup>84</sup> With such great success attending his position as Military Tribune, it is no great wonder that he was attended by great success in his run for the Quaestorship in 69-68.

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<sup>80</sup> Broughton; MRR 128. There seems to be a great deal of debate concerning the Plautius that appears in Suet. *Caes.* 5. According to Broughton, the Plautius in question is quite possibly the same M. Plautius Silvanus who, in 89, passed the *Lex Plautia Agraria* and the *Lex Plotia de Vi*.

<sup>81</sup> We have seen Caesar take similar actions in the previous chapter during his prepolitical career. His choice to indict high ranking officials rather than joining Lepidus in his revolt is similar to the actions he has taken here. Caesar's tendency to test the waters before jumping in head first is the epitome of his political style. Testing the resolve of the *Optimates* before enacting legislation allowed him to tiptoe through the proverbial minefield and emerge unscathed.

<sup>82</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 3

<sup>83</sup> Cic. *Div. in Caec.* 8 and Cic. *Verr.* 1.41-46; see also Broughton; MRR 126. In two separate court cases, M. Cicero takes the time to reiterate the fact that all of Rome was intent upon seeing the return of the Tribunician powers, a change in the composition of juries and the return of the Censorship. It stands to reason that Caesar as the new scion of the *Populares* would have allied himself with the two most powerful men in Rome to ask for the repeal of the last measures of the Sullan constitution. See also Kahn; *Education* 101-102.

<sup>84</sup> See Broughton; MRR V.II 126 for sources on the popularity contest between Pompey and Crassus. See also Plut. *Crass.* 12 for the consulship and the banquet of Crassus and Cic. *Verr.* I.31 for the votive games of Pompey.



### **The Quaestorship**

The office of Quaestor was one of the longest standing traditional political offices in Roman society, the roots of which reach back to the era of the kings. Initially, Quaestors bore the responsibility of seeing after criminal investigations, hence the official title of the position (*quaestor parricidii*). Soon after, the Quaestors took over the day-to-day operations of the treasury, becoming not only the chief accountants of the state but also the curators of the repository of laws in *aerarium Saturni*.<sup>85</sup> The third position that a Quaestor might hold, which remains the most likely one for Caesar to have held, both in terms of the sources and based on his natural proclivities, was the post of adjutant to the Praetor or Consul in the field. In this capacity, the Quaestor acted as second in command to the Praetor, Consul, or pro-Consul to whom he was assigned. In Caesar's case, the Quaestorship led him toward further Spain and a substantial personal realization. However, it is the events that took place prior to his departure that illustrate yet another one of his trademark political maneuvers.

### **A Funeral for Aunt Julia**

Caesar's aunt Julia died a short time after Caesar won the office of Quaestor and her death brought with it a very unique opportunity for Caesar to earn some political capital. As the wife of Gaius Marius, Julia held the distinction not only of being the wife of a seven-time Consul but of being the wife of the poster boy of the *Popularis* party. After

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<sup>85</sup> See Greenidge; *Public Life* 212-213 and Lintott; *Constitution* 133-134. Lintott points out the disparity between the words Quaestor and Quaesitor, the former being a term for "investigator" the latter being the term used for "quarter-master". While he admits that these two words belong to the same noun, he discounts the connection of the two offices. In truth, one who seeks after criminals is no different in the Roman mind to one who seeks after supplies.

the death of her only son at the hands of L. Catalina,<sup>86</sup> it remained for her nephew Caesar to declare the encomium over the body and lead the funeral procession through the city.

The funeral for the deceased matron of patrician descent, not to mention the wife of one of the most controversial figures in the Late-Republic, was a matter of no small consequence and every attention was paid to pomp and ceremony. Suetonius states that,

“As Quaestor Caesar praised both his aunt Julia and his wife Cornelia, who had died, before the rostra, as was traditional.”<sup>87</sup>

Two short lines capture the fundamental importance of a highly ritualized, exhaustively choreographed process, a public remembrance of the life and connections of an important person. It is within the framework of this complex and very public ritual that Caesar grasped the opportunity to inject important political and propagandistic messages that placed his family at the top of the hierarchy of elite families and re-emphasized his intent, on behalf of his storied and ancient family, to be the champion of the people.

Patrician funeral processions, especially those of well known individuals, were treated no differently than communal banquets or gladiatorial games. The lives of politicians and their families were spent in the public eye and their funerals were no exception. The funeral provided an opportunity for the family of the deceased individual to publicly acknowledge the status and the deeds of the individual; furthermore, it allowed them to remind the public of their families deeds throughout history. In fact, the entire procession was geared toward this end and fittingly, the procession, which began at

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<sup>86</sup> Comm. Pet. 3.10. The Death of Marcus Marius is described in detail.

<sup>87</sup> Suet. *Caes.* 6.1. “Quaestor Iuliam amitam uxoremque Corneliā defūtas laudavit e more pro rostris.” Suetonius reminds us that the declaration of the encomium was traditional and then omits the display of the *imagines* of Marius that is related in Plut. *Caes.* 5.1.

the home of the deceased, was brought almost immediately down to the Forum.<sup>88</sup> The body, in a reclining position, was placed on the rostrum and the encomium was delivered by the head of the family.<sup>89</sup> In the case of Julia, this duty fell to Caesar. Suetonius recorded Caesar's words on this occasion, which were fittingly geared both to honor Julia, the Julii, and to remind the public of the legacy which was now his.

“The family of my Aunt, Julia, descends from the kings, the family of my father has been tied to the immortal gods. For the Marcii Reges are descended from Anco Marcio, by which name my mother was called; and the Julii from Venus, from which our family descends. Therefore, there is in my family both sacred rulership, which makes us very powerful amongst men, and a certain divinity from the gods, from which gods these very same rulers draw their power.”<sup>90</sup>

The use of this occasion to remind the people of his lineage in an ancient and illustrious family was not uncommon nor was it particularly odd.<sup>91</sup> Yet, Caesar's recitation included the claim that the Julii were descended from the immortal gods themselves. It is hard to understand Caesar's motive to make such an ostentatious statement.<sup>92</sup> However, it was what he did next that roused the ire of *Optimates* and elicited cheers from the plebeians.

After the encomium had been delivered, the funeral procession went back to the home of the deceased and collected the funeral masks of distinguished ancestors and began its

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<sup>88</sup> Östenberg; “Power Walks” 14-16. Östenberg characterizes the aristocratic *funus* as an extension of the daily walk down to the Forum.

<sup>89</sup> J. Toynbee, *Death in the Roman World*; Cornell University Press; 1971 pg. 47. See also Poly. VI. 53.

<sup>90</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 6

<sup>91</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 2. Quintus Cicero remarks on the instant credibility pedigree gives a candidate.

<sup>92</sup> Even Suetonius was taken aback by Caesar's claim to descent from Venus. “sed in amitaē quidem laudatione de eius ac patris sui utraque origine sic refert.” The adversative “sed” obviously is meant to counter Suetonius' prior statement that Caesar pronounced the funeral oration “e more”. It must be the case that Suetonius thought that while the pronouncement of the encomium may have been traditional, the substance of it was not.

parade around the city.<sup>93</sup> The inclusion of other dead family members by means of *imagines* was not uncommon, especially amongst the rich and powerful. Again, the purpose was to augment the spoken word with a visual medium. Through the *imagines*, the entire family past and present could be witnessed by the populace. It was the *imagines* that Caesar decided to display in the procession that were highly controversial.

Plutarch takes over from Suetonius' short description of the encomium to record the procession itself.

“...on the other hand the second time the populace displayed its affection was when he pronounced, for the dead wife of Marius, being himself her nephew, a shining encomium in the Forum, and during the procession he showed courage in displaying images of Marius for the first time after the reign of Sulla, for Marius was judged an enemy of the state.”<sup>94</sup>

This ostentatious display of the *imago* of Marius was both a brilliant piece of propaganda and proved to be yet another successful test of Caesar's growing popularity. Plutarch concludes this episode by saying,

“for some had begun to cry out against Caesar for displaying the images of Marius but the plebs sang out in chorus, and pointed out with applause their amazement in seeing the images, saying that it was just as if the images were being lead, after a long time, out of the realm of Hades into the city.”<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> See D. Favro and C. Johanson, “Death in Motion: Funeral Processions in the Roman Forum”, *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*; V.69 (2010) pgs. 13-18. Favro and Johanson cite this as the first instance of returning to the home to collect the death masks of ancestors to the funeral of Scipio Africanus.

<sup>94</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.1. The differences between the two accounts are interesting, inasmuch as Suetonius recorded the speech given at the funeral and Plutarch the images. The most likely reason for this difference in accounts is purely cultural. Plutarch, a Greek, does not find it odd for one to include the gods in a genealogy, and Suetonius did not find it strange that Caesar would display images of Julia's husband, Marius.

<sup>95</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.2. Plutarch's beautiful imagery helps us understand the two agonists in this public disagreement and illustrates the interaction between the upper classes and the plebs. The first group consists of the “ἐνίων καταβοησάντων” and the second group consists of “ὁ δῆμος ἀντήχησε”. In effect, the few “bellowing ones” are answered by “the chorus of the demes”. Through this elusion to Greek drama, Plutarch illustrates to us the importance of the plebs and the source of their power. While the main characters of the drama, the elites, are constantly fighting amongst themselves, the plebs act as a chorus, working in unison to move the plot forward.

Again, it seems that Caesar is consciously testing his power in an attempt to ascertain the lay of the political landscape. The plebeians, who are the basis of his power, are now willing to stand with him publicly against the elite. Their joy at the return of their champion is attended now by their new champion. Through the audio-visual means of the funeral procession, Caesar was able to connect his family to the family of Marius and with the additions of the images of Marius, he was able to be the champion of a champion.<sup>96</sup> Caesar's public declaration of his intent to continue on in the capacity of the champion of the people was now a matter of record. His actions taken at the funeral illustrate the importance of public display in Rome. The promise he made to the plebeians was etched forever in their memory, a testament to his intentions.

### **Mourning Cornelia and Finding Alexander**

In addition to the funeral of his aunt Julia, Caesar laid to rest his first wife Cornelia prior to his call to Spain. Plutarch reports that it was unusual that Caesar spoke at the funeral of Cornelia, so unusual in fact that Caesar was the first to ever do it.<sup>97</sup> We cannot discount that Caesar may have been in deep mourning for a beloved wife, the mother of a beloved daughter; however, it has already been shown that there was a great deal of political capital to be gained from a funeral. This public display of affection for his wife

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<sup>96</sup> See T. O'Sullivan, Walking in Roman Culture; Cambridge University Press; 2011 pgs. 52-53 on the *funus* as mobile history.

<sup>97</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.2.

bound the plebs to him even tighter.<sup>98</sup> After the references made to his divine origins at Julia's funeral and his willingness to forgo conventions in the return of the images of Marius, he added to these a public display of his humanity at Cornelia's funeral. The two funerals provide another clue as to the source of Caesar's unbridled popularity. In these instances, is illustrated the indispensable attribute of the Roman politician. In Rome, a politician must be everything to everyone, always: hero to the oppressed, a champion for the old ways, a harbinger of new ways and one who is able to maintain his *humanitas* throughout.<sup>99</sup> Caesar's Quaestorship began with great political gain and great personal loss and his time in Spain would prove far less exciting than his previous commands, but a run in with the shade of Alexander the Great in Gades would push him towards even more exceptional gambles in the future and would mark yet another turning point in his career.

Spain, for many years past, had served as the *Kasten und Kirchof* of the growing Roman empire and the wars over the territory had brought some of the most famous men from the entire Roman world for nearly two centuries. Hannibal and Scipio Africanus had once done battle for its riches and until very recently, it had served as the home base of the anti-Sullan resistance movement headed up by Sertorius. For nigh unto a decade, the rebels of Spain had set up an opposition senate and government, managing to stave off the attacks of many a Roman legion. However, three years prior to the Quaestorship

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<sup>98</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.2. “καὶ τοῦτο ἤνεγκεν αὐτῷ χάριν τινα καὶ συνεδημαγώγησε τῷ πάθει τοὺς πολλοὺς ὥς ἡμερον ἄνδρα καὶ περίμεστον ἥθους ἀγαπᾶν.” The effect of a genuine show of feeling is quite remarkable. This seems especially true in Rome. We have no report of what was said, but the outcome seems quite clear.

<sup>99</sup> See Kahn; 102

of Caesar, the might of Pompey was unleashed upon the flagging resistance movement and both Sertorius and Lepidus were crushed under the weight of Roman resolve and assassin's daggers. As a result, Caesar had called for *clementia* on the behalf of those rebels who remained in hiding in Spain and Gaul, more specifically for his brother-in-law, L. Cinna. However, the former glamor of command in Spain was gone.

Little is reported about Caesar's activities during his time in further Spain. His day-to-day activities most likely followed the normal course of a provincial quaestor *sine bello*, filled with paperwork, inspections, judgements, and more paperwork. For an active individual like Caesar, this must have felt somewhat reminiscent of being entombed alive, chained to a desk. At least he had, in A. Vetius, a commander he could respect and the position he held as a provincial circuit court judge allowed him to see the inner workings of a province in real time.<sup>100</sup> Just as the military tribunate had served to instruct him in quarter mastery, so too did his time in Spain instruct him in provincial administration. His sojourn in Spain also provided him with ample opportunity to draw more provincial clients to himself. Since he had soundly declared, in word and deed, to the populace of Rome during the funeral for his aunt Julia that he had every intention of upholding the Marian name and the *Popularis* cause, there is little doubt that he canvassed Spain for clients, as most had remained loyal to the Marian cause during the recent upheavals.<sup>101</sup> Certainly, he would have laid claim to the allegiance of those patricians whose current life, liberty, and happiness he had fought to ensure in the senate.

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<sup>100</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.3

<sup>101</sup> Gelzer; *Caesar* 32

However, even in the midst of all this activity, Caesar was at the end of his rope. A trip to Gades would finally give him focus.

At that time, Caesar was sent around the province in his capacity as a circuit court judge. It happened that, during the trip, he passed by a Temple of Hercules, in which a statue of Alexander the Great held a prominent place. Suetonius relates that,

“In the house of Hercules, [Caesar’s] attention having been turned toward a statue of Alexander the Great, he bemoaned his fate, as if he was disgusted with his own worthlessness, as nothing worthy of memory had been done by him at his age, the same age at which Alexander had already subjugated the entire world...”<sup>102</sup>

Caesar, agonizing over his fate, reveals, yet again, his *humanitas*. For a moment, the unassailable Caesar of scholarship evaporates, and for a brief moment, he becomes Caesar, the man and politician. His calling as scion of the Julii, his attendant duties as benefactor to his clients and champion of the Roman people seem to him unfulfilled. He must do more.

While the veracity of this particular story is unclear at best,<sup>103</sup> one thing is clear. The ferocity with which Caesar pursues politics after Gades is unlike anything seen prior. Upon his return to the provincial capitol, he asked Vetius to release him from his duties as Quaestor immediately so that he might stand for the Aedileship in Rome. Passing through Gaul, he took the time to espouse the cause of the Gallic peoples, unhappy at

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<sup>102</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 7.1.

<sup>103</sup> See P. Green, *Classical Bearings: Interpreting Ancient History and Culture*; Thames and Hudson Publishing; 1989 pgs. 193-210. The account of Caesar’s call to action in Suetonius and in Cassius Dio is attended by the description of a prophetic dream that he had while visiting the shrine to Hercules in Gades. While we must dismiss the occurrence of the dream out of hand, we cannot afford to dismiss the effect that it had on Caesar’s actions in future political dealings and the great propaganda value it held. See Suet. *Iul.* 7 and Dio. 37.52.2 and 41.24.2.



being left out of the extension of citizenship rights to those south of the Po River in 90/89.<sup>104</sup>

Caesar had spent the years of his minor magistracies in collecting a vast amount of clients. Most were outside the sphere of immediate political power in Rome; however, the patrons he had collected there in Crassus and Pompey would allow him to play the game in the city and win. Caesar had completed his training in statecraft, first as Military Tribune during the Spartacan Rebellion, and secondly as the Quaestor of further Spain.

The Military Tribune had given him the opportunity to unite himself to the two most powerful men in Rome at the time, to espouse their cause, and to shut down, once and for all, the constitutional reforms of Sulla. By enjoining himself, a patrician, to the cause of two equites, he showed himself to be the consummate progressive aristocrat. Fighting for the return of Tribunician power, he secured the fealty of the Roman people. He then turned around and used the power that he had fought for to initiate the recall of his brother-in-law, for the sake of the family honor. Caesar was able to efficiently link his actions during the rebellion to the goals of his new patrons and to his own personal goals. Essentially, he was able to secure, by one act, the patronage of Pompey and Crassus, the return of the Tribunician powers, and the restoration of his family's honor.

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<sup>104</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 8 and Gelzer; Caesar 32. Suetonius reports that Caesar, while passing through Gaul, sought to foment rebellion amongst the Gauls for the cause of citizenship. He also states that he was only stopped from doing so by the two consular Legions that had been kept in Gaul at the time. This seems rather unlikely, when Caesar's prior actions during the Rebellion of Lepidus and Sertorius are taken into account. Gelzer, too, is taken in by Suetonius theory. Gelzer does not account for the fact that Caesar, as a Quaestor in a neighboring province, would have been fully aware of the presence of two legions in Gaul prior to his departure. Starting a popular uprising at this time would have only served to alienate the clients and patrons that he had meticulously cultivated in Rome. The more likely scenario, considering what is to come, is that Caesar went to Gaul for the sole purpose of promising to bring the plight of the trans-padene Gallic peoples to the Senate and at the same time to secure the disenfranchised Gauls as clients.

During his Quaestorship, Caesar was able to bring his family, front and center, into the spotlight of the Roman populace. The funeral for his aunt and later for his wife displays his mastery of the multimedia public event. At first glance, the funerals may appear to be nothing more than blatant opportunism, simply a politician looking for a podium. However, the pattern remains clear. By honoring these matrons of the house of the Julii, he was able to attach himself to the cause of Marius, to show himself to be a loyal member of an ancient and respected house, to make clear the duty and obligation that he himself felt towards this end, and to display his *humanitas* for all to see. During his time in further Spain, he was able to see provincial administration first hand and to deal with the problems that arose from it. He also used this time to secure even more clients than he already had in the city, and continuing into Gaul on his way home, he secured even more.

The efficiency with which Caesar was able to meet his goals both in legislation and politics is astounding. In truth, it is not the case that Caesar is three steps ahead of his competitors but that he makes three moves in one. This coupled with his skill in testing the political climate and his tendency towards taking calculated risks made him a very formidable opponent. Caesar used the Aedileship and the Praetorship to test out his new methods and with real power at stake, he would take even greater risks to ensure his continued place at the forefront of the Republic.

## THE AEDILESHIP AND THE PRAETORSHIP

### **The Eternal City**

If there is one great truth, it is that the world keeps turning, and for the Roman people, the world revolved around the Eternal City. Caesar had spent the better part of his tenure, as a politician and before, outside the city of Rome. His next two offices would bring him directly into the lion's den. Already a competent soldier, the new battlefield that awaited him was not one that he could control by command. He would have to rely heavily on the relationships and associations he had developed, both in the city itself and in the provinces, if he hoped to defend himself against the attacks of his enemies in the senate. These men would stop at nothing to get their way and, unfortunately for them, neither would Caesar.

Politics during the Late-Republic operated on a very different level at the center than at the periphery. The provinces were a place where a man could go to escape the city and the city was the place where things happened. A stay too long in either was a serious political mistake. Many fell victim to the city's charms, and her countless victims stood as a testament to her vicious and fickle temperament; after all, "This is Rome."<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Comm. Pet. 1. The *commentariolum* recommends that the politician, "prope cotidie tibi hoc ad forum descendenti meditandum est 'novus sum, consulatum peto, Roma est.'" Despite the reference specifically to the consulship the passage is equally applicable to any office.

In order to sooth the savage mistress, Caesar had begun, early in his career, to make huge outlays of money. The amount was surprising, even to Plutarch, who catalogued the lives of the rich, famous, and powerful.

“He proclaimed himself by his excessive outlays, and it was assumed that on the one hand he exchanged a transient and short lived fame for an exorbitant price, however, in truth, he was purchasing the greatest of things thriftily, it is said that before he began any sort of movement to establish himself he was thirteen-hundred talents in debt.”<sup>106</sup>

Plutarch also reports that Caesar, while curator of the Via Appia, spent vast amounts of money in its restoration, having borrowed the money to fix the road on his own personal credit.<sup>107</sup> These expenditures became the stuff of Late-Republican legend, but all would pale in comparison to the money he spent during the Aedileship and Praetorship. As a result, two questions must be asked regarding his debt and his expenditure during the Aedileship and Praetorship; first, why would Caesar, a man of no small means, choose to borrow excessive amounts of money and put himself in debt in order to achieve his desired ends, and second, what was this great thing that Plutarch says he purchased so thriftily?

Caesar had been seeding the political field in this way for nearly fifteen years. The honors he had won, the money he had spent, the clients he had secured and the time and effort he had invested in them, his family, and his party were about to bear fruit, yet, there can be no doubt that Caesar himself was unaware of how difficult the harvest would be.

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<sup>106</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5.4

<sup>107</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5

## **The Aedileship**

The office of Aedile was the highest of the lesser magistracies, after the Quaestorship and the office of Military Tribune. These offices represented the triad of hands-on work experience, the primer for Roman statecraft. The order in which they were undertaken was also of great importance; the first office, the Military Tribunate, taught the young political hopeful how to maintain an army in the field, how to keep it fed, and how and when to administer punishment and give rewards. The second, the Quaestorship, allowed the first decisions to be made regarding a politician's specialization. Heading up the *Aerarium Saturni* or becoming an assistant to a provincial Praetor or Consul allowed the first opportunity of both observing the administration of a province and dealing with it directly. The office also afforded the politician entry into the senate. The Aedileship stood on the precipice which led the way to the higher magistracies. For the first time in the career of a Roman politician, the training wheels came off, for in this office, there were no supervisors and their province was the city of Rome itself.<sup>108</sup>

As the name implies, the Aediles were in charge of the upkeep of the infrastructure of the city of Rome.<sup>109</sup> Initially, there were two separate branches of the office of Aedile, that of *curule* Aedile and the *plebeian* Aedile, the former being selected by *Comitia Tributa*, the latter by the *Concilium Plebis*. The selection process also differed in the degree of the magistrate who convened the voting, with the election of a *curule Aedile*

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<sup>108</sup> Lintott; *Constitution* 130. The wisdom of the *Cursus Honorum* becomes evident upon closer inspection. The *Cursus* allows the young politician to acclimate himself to larger and larger spheres of influence and to gain actual experience in the process. It is important also to note that influence comes with proximity to the city.

<sup>109</sup> Aedile is derived from the noun Aedis, an antiquated word by the time of the Late-Republic, referring to any kind of building meant for habitation, be it a temple or a private home.

being conducted by either a Praetor or Consul and the *plebeian Aedile* being conducted by a People's Tribune. This process of selection was the only distinction between them that remained in the Late-Republic, as the duties of all Aediles, no matter their social status or the process of their election, were shared between them.<sup>110</sup> The functions the Aediles performed were threefold and included the care of the city infrastructure, the care of the marketplace and trade, and the staging of the yearly games.

The Aediles were jointly tasked with enforcing a set of building and sanitation codes collectively known as the *Cura Urbis*.<sup>111</sup> In addition to the duty of ensuring the cleanliness and order of the city and its public buildings and water supply, the Aediles were empowered to create new legislation to this end and to bring charges against those who had violated these codes. However, this judicial power was limited to confiscation or destruction of the property in question, and any further consequence as a result of an infraction was heard on appeal to the people.<sup>112</sup>

The Aediles also maintained the various marketplaces around the city. This included both the buildings themselves and the fiscal concerns surrounding their day-to-day operations. The Aediles were involved in the process of determining prices for various staple foods, fixing and enforcing standards of weight and measures, and ensuring the price of grain in the marketplace.<sup>113</sup> In this sphere, they also had the ability to fine,

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<sup>110</sup> Lintott; *Constitution* 129-130. For further information on the development of the Aedileship, see Greenidge; *Public Life* 208-209.

<sup>111</sup> Greenidge; *Public Life* 209

<sup>112</sup> Greenidge; *Public Life* 210. The office of Aedile was not so empowered as to allow its holders to make any great political gains by bringing charges against other politicians. Interestingly enough, they did hold a measure of the power of *coercitio* to ensure that their legislation was not ignored.

<sup>113</sup> Greenidge; *Public Life* 210

confiscate, or destroy the property of anyone found guilty of criminal activity with respect to laws of trade.<sup>114</sup>

The third activity with which the Aediles were tasked was the presentation of the various games held within the city throughout the year. The *ludi Romani* and the *ludi Plebeii* were officiated by the curule Aediles and the Plebeian Aediles, respectively. These were particularly spectacular events, and could be used as a springboard to the Praetorship, as will soon be evidenced by the actions of Caesar.

The Aedileship was a daunting office to say the least. The duties entailed within its mandates were enough to share with twenty men, let alone four. However, the greatest price of this office was its position in the city. The Aedile was an easy target, even an Aedile with prominent friends could not be assured of his safety. Mediocrity was the order of the day, lest ambition rouse the ire of a city's worth of senators. Unfortunately, this was not Caesar's way, especially since the realization he made at Gades, standing at the feet of the statue of Alexander in the house of Hercules.<sup>115</sup>

### **Conspiracy: Real or Implied**

A few days before Caesar took up his position as one of the newly elected curule Aediles, trouble was brewing. According to Suetonius, "...he came under suspicion of conspiring with M. Crassus, a consular man, and also P. Sulla and L. Autronius, both

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<sup>114</sup> See Lintott; Constitution 132, especially F.N. 44 for evidence of the use of prosecutorial power by the Aediles in matters of trade and business.

<sup>115</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 7

having been condemned of bribery after they had been elected to the consulship.”<sup>116</sup> Supposedly, in retaliation for being slighted in this way, the Consuls designate had conspired with Gn. Piso to murder L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, the Consuls that had been elected after their disgrace.<sup>117</sup> In addition Crassus and Caesar were to take a fuller part in the *insidiae*, for they were to be installed as Dictator and Master of Horse in the interim, until the consulship of P. Sulla and L. Autronius might be restored.<sup>118</sup> It was theorized that Crassus and Caesar had every intention of reforming the constitution in the way they saw fit, and of setting themselves up as kings.

The only problem with this conspiracy was that there was no clear evidence for its existence. What few sources Suetonius gives for the conspiracy are taken from the speeches made after the fact by Marcus Bibulus, C. Scribonius Curio the Elder, a history lost to us, authored by T. Geminus, and an oblique reference made by Cicero in a letter to Axius some years after the incident. In addition to the lack of direct evidence, it seems that even on the day the supposed plot was to occur, nothing happened. Crassus did not show up and Caesar did not give the signal described in the speech of Curio.<sup>119</sup> The business day went on and Caesar began his Aedileship on schedule. Why then did the *Optimates* waste so much time bandying about accusations, and why, for years

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<sup>116</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 9.1. For their conviction, see Cic. *Sull.* 91 and Sall. *Cat.* 18

<sup>117</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 18

<sup>118</sup> Here the sources diverge drastically. While Suetonius (Suet. *Iul.* 9) maintains that it was Caesar and Crassus who were to give the signal, in Sallust's record of events (Sall. *Cat.* 18), it was Catiline and Autronius who were to give the signal. I am more inclined to side with Sallust in the matter, as he was actually there to witness the events unfolding. However, as a *Popularis* politician, his interest in recording the events in such a way as to remove Caesar and Crassus from the plot cannot be disregarded.

<sup>119</sup> Suet. 9. Unfortunately, none of these sources exist for the benefit of modern scholars. See Gelzer; Caesar 39



afterwards, did they insist that the plot was genuine? A clue to this question lies in the *Commentariolum*.

Conspiracy theories became the bread and butter of politics during the Late-Republic. The fact that this tactic is still heavily relied upon today should speak volumes about its effectiveness. The goal, then and now, is not to prove the collusion of others, but merely to cast doubts on their character, beliefs, or politics. The *Commentariolum* advises a politician to,

“Speak well so that you are well known, do this so that you know that you are a man capable of bringing about the greatest fear of judgement and danger in your competitors. Do all this so that they know that they are guarded and also observed by you...I do not wish you to display these things to them openly, so that you seem to be meditating on accusing any of your competitors at this time, but so that by fear you might more easily obtain that which you seek to gain and in this wise by the even stretching of every nerve and faculty we might obtain that which we seek.”<sup>120</sup>

By causing a competitor to fear for his safety or reputation, it is possible both to curtail any ostentatious action on his part and to make him less inclined to bring suit. In the case of the aforementioned conspiracy, having successfully prosecuted the Consuls designate for electoral bribery, the *Optimates* believed that the threat of action would prove more useful against parties which had no hand in the conspiracy than taking action against the conspirators without solid evidence.<sup>121</sup> However, the benefits that might be gained by the use of such a tactic also reveal its most glaring flaw and also reveal a singularly important

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<sup>120</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 55-56

<sup>121</sup> Gelzer; *Caesar* 38-40 According to Gelzer, nearly every source provided by Suetonius came after the event. Gelzer's argument against Caesar's involvement in this conspiracy, due mainly to the fact that one of the Consuls set to be murdered, L. Aurelius Cotta, was his cousin, carries with it a great deal of merit. However, on the whole, Gelzer does not admit the fact that Caesar, having been faced with multiple opportunities to foment rebellion, had not done so.

truth surrounding the conspiracies of the Late-Republic. One need only keep those he fears afraid. Even as an Aedile, Caesar must have been a great source of fear for the *Optimates*. His popularity with the people, especially after the funeral oration for Julia and the return of the *imagines* of Marius, must have been quite disturbing to them. Caesar's open declaration of his intent to revive the Marian party placed a giant target on his back.<sup>122</sup> Feeling the pressure, Caesar did what came natural. He redecorated the Forum.

As mentioned previously, it was within the Aedile's jurisdiction to oversee the upkeep and beautification of public spaces, the foremost of these being the Forum itself. In what was most likely a response to the charges of conspiracy hinted at by the *Optimates*, Caesar began to revamp the Forum aggressively by setting up movable colonnades on which he placed his collections of art and exotic treasures, creating a mobile museum in the midst of the Forum. In addition to these changes, he began work on reconstructing and expanding the existing Basilica.<sup>123</sup> There can be no doubt that such a display increased traffic through the Forum a great deal. The Romans were a people who enjoyed a spectacle and the person who was able to bring it to them was always held in

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As a matter of fact, in these situations, it could be said that Caesar has sought political gains through normal channels. His refusal to follow Lepidus and Sertorius and his subsequent petition for clemency on L. Cinna's behalf, his total lack of desire to use the disenfranchised Gauls, and the lack of evidence regarding his involvement in this latest conspiracy tell an entirely different tale. Caesar has not once made an attempt at open rebellion and has, on the whole, taken completely legal and precedented steps to control his political opponents.

<sup>122</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 6.1

<sup>123</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 10. The specific Basilica is not attested in the source material; however, Richardson (Richardson; 173) implies that the Basilica Paulli (Basilica Aemilia) was the first building in the Forum to be restored by Caesar. The restoration of the Basilica was also accompanied by retractable awnings, making the Forum more comfortable for its patrons, ostensibly allowing citizens to remain in the Forum for longer periods of time.

high regard. With the increase in traffic came an increase in those citizens who recognized, in some shape or form, that Caesar was their benefactor. In a sense, Caesar had begun to use the Forum as if it were the atrium of his own home, where the Roman people came to witness the displays of Caesar's power and prestige.<sup>124</sup> As a result, he did not need to deny involvement in the conspiracy publicly, for he made his stance clear through every one of his public works. The conscientious adornment and expansion of the Forum was an integral step in Caesar's push to design the stage upon which he would play; the role he would play was already well established. Caesar solidified this notion in his next great showpiece, a set of games so opulent that their like would not be seen again until the age of the Emperors.

Caesar's position as Aedile made mandatory the exhibition of the seasonal games. The curule Aediles held the responsibility of organizing the set of games known as the *ludi Romani*, and so the duty fell to Caesar and his colleague Marcus Bibulus. Not to be outdone by anyone, or even to be repeated, Caesar furnished three hundred and twenty pairs of gladiators adorned in silver armor.<sup>125</sup> Not only did he provide the entertainment, but he also provided feasts, dramatic productions, and processions.<sup>126</sup> So great was his contribution and so memorable the games that Bibulus, who had also spent some of his

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<sup>124</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 35. In referencing the daily throng that appeared at the doors of politicians throughout the city, the *Commentariolum* states that, "You must notably turn your attention to those who come into your home; more specifically you must put on a show for their friends, who have heard tell of you and must speak personally with them often. In this way, men often give themselves to a candidate, for after they have gone to meet many candidates and they see a candidate to be someone who turns his attentions towards his duties in the greatest way, they will desert the others and little by little they will stop attending them, and subsequently will leave from the false group as strong voters." It is not difficult to see that Caesar was using the Forum, the atrium of the city, in this way.

<sup>125</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5 and Plin. *N.H.* 33.53

<sup>126</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 5

own money in the effort, was given little or no credit. According to Suetonius, Bibulus joked that, "... even as the temple for the twin brothers, having been set up in the forum, is so often called the Temple of Castor, so too the notoriety of his own generous gift was awarded to Caesar alone."<sup>127</sup>

These massive games were not the last of Caesar's showpieces during his Aedileship. The final act revolved around an attempt Caesar had made to secure an extraordinary command or governorship over Egypt, which had recently fallen into disarray after the citizens of Alexandria had overthrown the king there.<sup>128</sup> According to Suetonius, Caesar again enlisted the help of the People's Tribunes to push the bill for his command through the *Comitia Tributa*. The measure was defeated by *Optimate* opposition and the plan quickly dissolved.<sup>129</sup> This plan, however excessive it might seem to the modern audience, should in no wise be construed as overstepping the bounds of Roman law, since Pompey had done the exact same thing to receive command of the pirate campaigns in 67.<sup>130</sup> In truth, the attempt to secure a command in Egypt seems to have been a clear case of striking while the iron was hot. Even failure in the attempt revealed important

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<sup>127</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 10 and Caes. *B.C.* III.16.3. So great was the animosity that M. Bibulus bore for Caesar that this single event would reach into their joint consulship.

<sup>128</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 11. Suetonius places the highest importance on these games as a stepping stone to the extraordinary command in Egypt. It is most likely that Caesar did take advantage of the games being fresh on the minds of the populace to launch the attempt, however it is not reasonable that Caesar would have pushed his luck so far based solely on the the popular approval of his games. The sum total of his actions on behalf of the populace must be taken into account to understand why he would hazard such a maneuver (See Plut. *Caes.* 6).

<sup>129</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 11 and Plut. *Caes.* 6

<sup>130</sup> See de Souza; *Piracy* 161-167 for the justification of the extraordinary command given Pompey against the Pirates in 67. See also Gruen; *Last Generation* 63-65 for the list of extraordinary commands given him in subsequent years which included the command of the legions charged with defeating Mithridates. It cannot be argued that Caesar was turned down for the command in Egypt based on the fact that he had never held the office of Praetor or Consul, since Pompey had held no office prior to his consulship, which consulship was taken by himself and Crassus at the point of a sword in 70, following the Slave Revolt and the campaign against Sertorius in Spain. (see Broughton; *MRR V.II* 126 and Plut. *Pomp.* 21-22)

information. The senate and the people of Rome clearly required further reminding of whose interests Caesar was upholding and who Caesar was representing.<sup>131</sup>

So it was that in the early morning hours of an unknown day in 65, the people of Rome awoke to a most brilliant sight. There in the Forum, for all to see, stood the gleaming effigy of Marius, finely wrought in gold. Included in the display were winged Victories holding the trophies of Marius, which he won in campaigns against the Cimbri.<sup>132</sup> Emotions ran high in the Forum that day, and the statues were greeted by some with anger and by others with tears. Those who had supported Marius when he was alive flocked to the Forum in such great numbers that those who had been but recently scoffing at the hubris shown by Caesar in returning the monuments were swept away by the immense crowd of people overjoyed at their return. In short, Caesar could not have been more pleased at the response, even if he had orchestrated it himself. The return of the trophies of Marius speaks volumes about the feelings of the average citizen in Rome, especially in the light of how the people had received the return of the *imagines* of Marius at the funeral of Julia. Obviously the sting of Marius' loss to Sulla was still a sore spot in the hearts of many Romans throughout the city.<sup>133</sup> Despite the fact that this ostentatious display was concocted to draw attention away from the failed power grab, it tells us a great deal about the attitudes and opinions of many citizens who still held their ties of clientship to Marius very dearly. The image of Marian supporters seemingly appearing out of thin air, standing in wonderment and weeping at the sight of their fallen

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<sup>131</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 6

<sup>132</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 11

<sup>133</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 6.

patron, is a powerful one. Therefore, it is crucial to seek an understanding of the Patron-Client relationship and, more specifically, the notion of a mutual bond between patron and client. It is clear from the evidence that this bond was not always consistent with the relationship between a master and subordinate. The bonds that tied these men to Marius bound them to him even in death. The strength of this bond was now being used to bring them into Caesar's camp.<sup>134</sup> As nephew to Marius, Caesar stood as the heir apparent.

It is at this time that a distinct change can be observed in the way that Caesar was using his associations to build up his client base. He no longer needed to secure clients actively as he did in his early career in Spain, Pontic Greece, and Gaul. He could now rest assured that those plebeians in Rome seeking an active patron would secure him.

The *Commentariolum* mentions the method by which this shift is achieved.

“You would do well for yourself if your friendship with them was not brief and expressly for the purposes of gaining their vote, but your friendship should be strong and longstanding, so that your beneficence be worthy, so that you love them and owe them. Do this in such a way that they understand that you esteem them as being of the greatest importance to your campaign. Believe me that no one will allow this time of establishing a friendship with you pass them by, least of all those who have brought their error to you so that they might petition with you, rather than petition for those men for whom the duties of friendship are either valued little or are fled from entirely.”<sup>135</sup>

Caesar's excessive spending early on in his political career was actually being invested in clientage. This freed Caesar from the concerns of active petitioning for all future offices.

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<sup>134</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 6. Plutarch describe the feeling of the crowd of Marian supporters, “...κρότω κατεῖχον τὸ Καπιτώλιον πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ δάκρθα τὴν Μαρίου Θεωμένοις ὄψιν ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἐχώρει, καὶ μέγας ἦν ὁ Καῖσαρ ἐγκωμίους αἰρόμενος, ὥς ἀντὶ πάντων ἄξιος εἶη ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς Μαρίου συγγενείας συναχθείσης δὲ περὶ τούτων τῆς βουλῆς...” In Plutarch's account, the supporters seem to reach an agreement as to Caesar's worthiness to lead the Marian party almost immediately upon being overcome by the sight of the ornate statues. Note the extensive use of the Present Passive participle not only as substantives used to refer to the Marian supporters, but also to show the aspect of simultaneous occurrence.

<sup>135</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 26-27

Caesar had deposited a great deal of money into the bank of public opinion and would be able to live comfortably on the dividends for the rest of his career. The true secret to his success was not that he bought the allegiance of many people but that he was not counted among those, “for whom the duties of friendship are either valued little or are fled from entirely.”

All that has been discussed concerning friendship, clientship, and patronage can best be summed up by one cultural concept, *gratias*. *Gratias* defined the give and take of any Roman relationship. The modern definition applied to this word, ‘Thankfulness’, does not begin to encapsulate the meaning for a Roman. Giving thanks (*agere gratias*) and returning thanks (*referre gratias*) were not related to a feeling one had, but to the obligation one had to maintain the balance of friendship (*amicitia*). This most basic principle drove Roman commerce, politics, filial relationships, and the Patron-Client relationship.<sup>136</sup>

Caesar’s entire career had been built using the principle of *gratias*. Up to the end of his Aedileship, he had been the one giving thanks to his supporters. His support of the Greeks against Dolabella; his speaking out on behalf of Pompey and Crassus for the return of the Tribunician powers; his support for clemency with regard to the Lepidan and Sertorian conspirators; his resurrection of the *imagines* of Marius; his improvements of the Via Appia and the Forum; the lavish games and the return of the statues and trophies of Marius are all examples of his *gratias*. It was now the people’s turn to return thanks to him, and they would prove their loyalty in the difficult days that lay ahead.

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<sup>136</sup> See Meier; Caesar 137-138

### **A Hard Two Years**

The years 64 and 63 were unparalleled in Caesar's political career for both their danger and his daring. In the face of overwhelming *Optimate* opposition, Caesar, for the first time, would have to rely on the people to see him through. In Caesar's case, the people's returning of the *gratias* he had shown them would be equal to even his most opulent spectacle or his most ostentatious beneficence. Twice in the course of the next two years, the people would turn out in great numbers, of their own accord, to aid Caesar in his times of need. His prosecution of Gaius Rabirius, the Catilinarian conspiracy, and his run for *Pontifex Maximus* were fraught with peril and it was, very certainly, only by the power of the people that he saw them through.

Caesar spent the majority of 64 in the office of the *iudex quaestionis*, which represented yet another preparatory office. In this case, as in the case of the Military Tribune and the Quaestorship, he heard the court cases that were overseen by the Praetors.<sup>137</sup> During this time, Caesar began to prosecute those who had been loyal to Sulla. It was under this charge that G. Rabirius entered the court of Caesar. On this point, Suetonius alleges that Caesar had an unknown person prefer the charge against aged Rabirius, and positioned himself to be the judge on the case.<sup>138</sup> This is not surprising, seeing that it was Rabirius who had carried out the assassination of the People's Tribune Saturninus.

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<sup>137</sup> Greenidge; *Public Life* 204

<sup>138</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 12 and Dio 37.10.2, Broughton; *MRR V.II* 167 refers to the People's Tribune T. Labienus as the man who preferred the charges against G. Rabirius. See also Cic. *Rab. Perd. passim* and Dio. 37.26.1



Lucius Appuleius Saturninus had suffered the same fate as the Gracchi brothers had fifty years before. His support of Marius during his fifth and sixth consulship, in procuring land allotments and pushing through *Popularis* reform measures, made him an instant target for those loyal to Sulla. Caesar's interest in the case was inestimable, seeing that Saturninus was a great supporter of his uncle and that the assassination of a People's Tribune was quite possibly one of the most sacrilegious acts that any Roman might commit. All of this aside, Caesar's desire to sit on this case stemmed from his desire to illustrate the growing power of the *Popularis* party under his leadership and to settle an old family score. Caesar moved ahead with the trial, securing Rabirius' conviction. Upon appeal, he was acquitted, based primarily on the apparent over-exuberance with which Caesar had found him guilty.<sup>139</sup> The actions of Marius and Sulla, dead now for over two decades, still cast a long shadow over the city. It would be the conspiracy of one of the most apt disciples and gifted proteges of Sulla that would blow the city wide open, but for now, Caesar set his sights on the office of *Pontifex Maximus* which had recently become vacant.

At that time, it happened that the serving *Pontifex Maximus*, Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, died, thus leaving the office of the chief priest of the state open. Caesar leapt at the opportunity, not only for the honor which this post bestowed upon its holder but for another reason entirely. He needed to stop the *Optimates* blocking tactics, which

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<sup>139</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 12. See also Gruen; *Last Generation* 412. For the specifics of the defense, see Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 1-13

regularly employed religious law as a method to stop or at least slow the gears of government.<sup>140</sup>

It was for this reason that he embarked on a campaign of massive bribery to achieve his end. Even Suetonius marvels at the scope of it, and the blatant risk Caesar took in initiating the scheme.<sup>141</sup>

“With the hope of the Province of Egypt having been laid aside, he petitioned for the office of *Pontifex Maximus* not without the greatest outpouring of bribery; at that time, calculating the magnitude of the money he borrowed, as he descended to the voting assembly in the morning, he gave a kiss to his mother and leaving the house he said to her that he would come back as *Pontifex* or not at all. And so, in this way, his two competitors who superseded him in both age and dignity he soundly defeated to such a degree that he himself gained more votes in their tribes than his competitors gained in all the other tribes.<sup>142</sup>

Such a landslide victory, especially for someone who had yet to serve as Consul, was unthinkable. The bribery was well attested. Why then would Caesar nearly end his entire career for an office that granted him little if any real power? The push for the position of *Pontifex* was more an insurance policy than anything else. Caesar was setting himself up for the Praetorship and consulship which he must have known were coming. With this newfound power, he was able not only to determine the meaning of all communications with the gods, but he could determine the validity of anyone else’s claim to divine communication.<sup>143</sup> Such a power would soon prove useful, but for now, a greater trouble was brewing for the Republic.

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<sup>140</sup> See Gruen; The Last Generation 254-259 on *Optimate* obstruction, especially on *obnuntio*, or the use of religious omens to inhibit the workings of government.

<sup>141</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 13, Sall. *Cat.* 49 and Plut. *Caes.* 7.1.

<sup>142</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 13. See also A. Lintott, “Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic”, *JRS*; V. 80 (1990) pgs. 1-11 for a comprehensive look at electoral bribery and its link to the Patron-Client relationship.

<sup>143</sup> See Lintott; Constitution 104

Lucius Sergius Catilina had a long history of petitioning the people for the consulship and in 63, he ran for the third and last time in a brutal race against M. Cicero. The *Commentariolum* sheds light on the sentiments of the upper classes against one of their own. The description of Catiline's offenses against the citizens and against the state is catalogued thoroughly. Together with his running mate M. Antonius, Catiline is depicted as one of the worst degenerates and most brazen criminals that Rome has ever seen.

“And the other [Catiline], Good Gods! What is so great about him? In the first place he is from the same class as Antonius. Is he not from a higher rank? No. But he has more courage. On what account? Antonius fears his own shadow, Catiline fears not even the laws, born into the poverty of his father, brought up in his sister's whorish ways, a collaborator in the killing of citizens, a man whose introduction to politics in the Roman cavalry was a bloodbath (for who could forget those Gauls who deprived the Titinii, the Nanni and the Tanusi of their heads, with Catiline, who had been installed by Sulla, in command); in which time Q. Caecilius, the greatest man, the husband of Catiline's own sister, a Roman knight, a man who proclaimed no party, who was always naturally peaceful, and had become more so in his old age, was killed by Catiline with his own two hands.”<sup>144</sup>

It was for such a man that Caesar first stood in the Senate to act as the voice of the *Popularis* party and it was his impassioned speech, not so much on behalf of this known murderer and conspirator, but on behalf of justice, that roused the attention of the Senate.<sup>145</sup> One man, M. Porcius Cato Minor, rose to combat him and, in so doing, took up the mantle of the head of the *Optimate* party.<sup>146</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 2.9. See also *Comm. Pet.* 3-4 and Sall. *Cat.* 14-16 for a fuller list of Catiline's depravities and Appendix.

<sup>145</sup> Sall. *Cat.* 51.37. In an amusing twist, Caesar cites the *lex Porcia*, a law passed by Cato's grandfather, forbidding the flogging of citizens for infractions of the law to argue against their arbitrary execution.

<sup>146</sup> See Sall. *Cat.* 51-52 for the substance of the argument proposed by Caesar and Cato. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this passage is actually the speech of Caesar or a compounded version of the main points by Sallust (Sall. *Cat.* 50 “Sed Caesar, ubi ad eum ventum est, rogatus sententiam a consule, huiusmodi verba locuta est”). Either way, Sallust still stands as a primary source, seeing that he was in attendance that day in the senate.

The rise of these two men, an ex-Aedile and a Plebeian Tribune, to speak on any matter, was rare occurrence. What is even more astounding is that Cicero, the standing Consul, inquired as to their opinion on the matter (*rogatus sententiam a consule*). It is clear from this evidence that the two parties were in the hands of a new generation. The animosity that Caesar and Cato bore for one another would lead to legendary clashes in the future, but this particular Senatorial debate was about to get violent, and an intercession from a source no one could have imagined was about to take place.

The anger the *Optimates* felt at the Senate's decision to kill some of the conspirators outright and to exile Catiline was unbearable. Catiline was alive and Caesar was to blame. Instantly, rumors began circulating that Caesar had had some part in the plan. Caesar was called into the Senate a few days after the speech to give a deposition on the part he might have played in the conspiracy. Plutarch reports that,

“a few days later he [Caesar] having arrived in the Senate, was to give a report concerning the conspiracy, since he was under suspicion, when a great noise fell upon the Senate House. It happened that his dependents were gathering together around the time that business should have been concluded in the Senate and they came standing around and shouting, demanding that Caesar be returned to them and for the Senate to let him go.”<sup>147</sup>

It is one thing to plan a political rally, or to stage a show as was seen in the funeral processions, but to be able to conjure a flash-mob out of thin air was unheralded in Roman politics. The friendship that Caesar had shown for his people was being returned to him tenfold. This incident even frightened Cato to the point where he increased the grain dole to astronomical proportions to keep the people satisfied.<sup>148</sup> In point of fact, the

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<sup>147</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 9.3

<sup>148</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 9.4

turn out was so immense that Cato mistook Caesar's regular client base for a revolutionary movement. Such support was not cheap nor was it completely about money. Whatever Caesar had done for the people must have exceeded mere payouts for them to act together like this. They knew their patron was in trouble and immediately rallied around him. This is how the Patron-Client system was meant to work.<sup>149</sup>

### **The Praetorship**

Praetor was originally the name by which the Consuls were called and the office was clearly linked to the functions of war and judgement.<sup>150</sup> Praetors served as the minor colleagues of the Consuls, performing the role of judicial overseers. The Praetorship consisted of two separate branches, that of the *Praetor Urbanus* and the *Praetor Peregrinus*; the first served as a Grand Jury for the city proper and the second served a similar function with respect to foreigners and noncitizens. With the expansion of the Roman provinces came an expansion in the number of serving Praetors, being eight in number by the time that Caesar stood for the office.<sup>151</sup> The most crucial difference between the Praetorship and all previous offices was that its holders were themselves invested with the *imperium*. This allowed Praetors to command armies, to exercise the

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<sup>149</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 36-37 describes the action of attendance which is very similar to what is described in this incident with Caesar. The glaring difference is that those who attended Caesar on that day did so out of pure allegiance to him. The *Commentariolum* suggests that a candidate compel those who owe him something to accompany him and if they cannot come, they should be compelled to send another of their family in their place. To have a group descend *en masse* to lend their support on a moment's notice is simply a profound case of the regular function of the *deducendi*.

<sup>150</sup> Lintott; *Constitution* 104

<sup>151</sup> Greenidge; *Public Life* 202

right of *coercito*, and to render binding judgements in criminal cases.<sup>152</sup> In addition to these rights, Praetors were given six lictors to accompany them as a public display of their status.<sup>153</sup>

After the tumultuous years of 64-63, Caesar launched himself yet again, in 62, into the cycle of petitioning, this time for the office of Praetor. In truth, the Praetorship was not at all unlike what Caesar had been doing for the previous three years, only now, he oversaw the men whose position he had occupied before. His change in status ultimately put him in a position to aid an old commander and friend, Gn. Pompeius Magnus.

To put it plainly, the source material regarding Caesar's Praetorship is sparse. His ancient biographers chose to focus the bulk of their material on his political maneuverings on behalf of Pompey, who had been absent from Rome for some time. Pompey's extraordinary commands in the east against the pirates and Mithradates VI had kept him out of Rome for five years, yet news of his victories reached Rome without fail, and every new exploit ended in victory. Such an untarnished record of martial valor was unparalleled in the history of The City, and Caesar could do nought but join himself to Pompey.<sup>154</sup> The *Commentariolum* underscores the usefulness of having Pompey for an ally in these times, stating that,

“All of these men must be diligently asked for their support; they must be urged and they must be persuaded that we have always felt as the *Optimates* do concerning the Republic; we have seldom been with the *Populares* and if we seem to have said anything of a popular nature, we did this with the goal of bringing

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<sup>152</sup> See Lintott; *Constitution* 95-97

<sup>153</sup> Greenidge; *Public Life* 203

<sup>154</sup> See T.R. Holmes, *The Roman Republic: and the Founder of the Empire*; Oxford, Clarendon Press; 1923 pgs. 203-220 for a condensed version of the victories of Pompey from the Social Wars to Palastine.

Gn. Pompeius on board, so that we might have that very influential man either as a friend in this campaign or, at the very least, not as an enemy.”<sup>155</sup>

The clout of a victorious general was the new political currency of the realm, and Caesar had set himself on such a path from the time he had undertaken the office of Military Tribune. Pompey’s return was the hot button topic of 62. Many wondered whether he would return and take the city by force, as Sulla and Marius had done thirty years prior. The fear of this eventuality drove the *Optimates* to contemplate every means at their disposal to limit, curtail, or otherwise diminish the power that Pompey might hold in the city upon his return.<sup>156</sup> Caesar worked feverishly against these designs and his support of Pompey landed him in hot water on the first day of his Praetorship.

### **The First Day and the Longest Day**

Caesar wasted no time in championing the position of Pompey in the city. His very first act as Praetor *Urbanus* was to question Q. Lutatius Catulus about his failure to complete work on his commission to rebuild and refurbish the Temple of Capitoline Jupiter, since the temple stood incomplete fifteen years after the commission had been handed down and seven years after the temple had been rededicated. The obvious purpose of this move was to discredit the *Optimates*, setting the blame squarely on their shoulders for at best dragging their feet and, at worst, misappropriating the funds set aside for the project. As *Pontifex Maximus* and Praetor, it was well within Caesar’s jurisdiction to question Catulus on this point. It also served to show that the party, which

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<sup>155</sup> *Comm. Pet.* 1.5

<sup>156</sup> Gelzer; *Caesar* 55-56

used religion to further the cause of foot dragging, could be found doing both at once at one of the most important religious sites within the city itself.<sup>157</sup>

Such a bombastic opening move could only be countered by the *Optimates* with sheer influence and force of numbers. The return of Pompey was drawing ever closer and the presence of one of Pompey's most trusted legates, Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos, in the city as a People's Tribune compounded the alarm.

Q. Metellus Nepos had come to the city, ahead of his general, to secure his homecoming and to turn things around for Pompey in the city.<sup>158</sup> Caesar joined with Nepos in his bid to have Pompey recalled from the mop up operations to join the fight against the army of Catiline, which was still in the field. On top of this report, Gelzer adds that it was possible that Caesar and Nepos were to sponsor a bill allowing Pompey to run for the consulship *in absentia*, a point well taken as Caesar will attempt the exact same maneuver in a little under two years.<sup>159</sup>

Cato the younger, of course, was at the center of the move to veto the bill being brought forward by Nepos and Caesar, knowing full well that the people would vote in favor of almost anything for a victorious general. In an attempt to block the vote, Q. Minucius Thermus and Cato vetoed the motion outright and would not allow the motion

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<sup>157</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 15. Cassius Dio reports that Caesar intended to place the restoration in the hands of Pompey upon his return. See Dio 37.44.1-2

<sup>158</sup> This is the same Q. Metellus Nepos who vetoed the end of term speech of Cicero. See Dio 37.38 and Cic. *Fam.* 5.2.6-7

<sup>159</sup> Gelzer; *Caesar* 56



to be read. In response, according to Plutarch, Nepos let loose a number of armed men to drive the *Optimates* out of the voting area.<sup>160</sup>

On account of this uproar, the Senate took action, stripping Caesar and Nepos of their duties, but, while Nepos fled back to Pompey, Caesar continued to hold court. Finally, Caesar relented, seeing that the Consuls intended to use force of arms to remove him from office. In a calculated public display, according to Suetonius, Caesar "...dismissed his lictors and having thrown down his robe of office he returned home quietly..."<sup>161</sup> The reaction of the people to this was swift and overwhelming. Within days, the populace of Rome was demanding Caesar's reinstatement and threatening violence.<sup>162</sup> In the face of such overwhelming numbers, the Senate had no other recourse but to reverse its decision. Furthermore, it had been Caesar who had kept the people quiet, speaking against any violence. As a result, not only was his office returned to him but he was sent off with a vote of thanks for his handling of the situation.<sup>163</sup> The *Optimates* had been bested again by the people and Caesar had reaped the benefits of this return of thanks.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Gelzer; Caesar 57. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 26; c.f. Suet. *Iul.* 16. The reaction of the senate seems to support the narrative of Plutarch. If there was no open violence, it would not make sense for the senate to suspend Caesar and Nepos from dispensing their duties. Perhaps the incident was so well known that Suetonius did not feel the need to explain it to his audience.

<sup>161</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 16. "... qui vi ac per arma prohiberent, dimissis lictoribus abiectaque praetexta domum clam refugit..." c.f. Gelzer; Caesar 57. Gelzer misses the throwing down of the robe as a public display. It can be argued that the proximity of *clam* to *refugit* positively shows that the only thing that was secret was his return home and it makes clear the point of the display. After dismissing his lictors and throwing down his robe of office, he disappears. In this case, his absence from public life is every bit as alarming for the people as his flamboyant exit from it.

<sup>162</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 16.2

<sup>163</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 16.2

<sup>164</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 16

### **The Propraetorship**

On completion of his duties as Praetor, Caesar was returned to the province of Further Spain, where he had spent his Quaestorship. Keeping his creditors at bay with securities put up by Crassus for the loans he had taken out, he raced towards his province well ahead of the time he was scheduled to receive funding and jurisdiction.<sup>165</sup> Recent trouble had been brewing with the bandits that infested the mountainous regions of Lusitania and he had every intention of taking advantage of the situation.<sup>166</sup> He fought every engagement with the avowed intention of bringing victory to his troops, in the same manner that Pompey had brought victory to his own. By the end of the campaign, Caesar was hailed with the title *Imperator* by his troops and was voted a triumph by the Senate and people of Rome.<sup>167</sup>

This short respite in Spain revitalized Caesar. Away from the city, he was master and commander of his province. Now a victorious general and a well regarded administrator, he could return to Rome and petition for the highest office of the Republic. His return would not be welcomed by all, but he could be sure of one thing. His efforts in the city and in the provinces were not wasted. He had built a reputation and funded a widespread following of clients and those clients had shown their willingness to espouse his cause anytime, anywhere. The relationship he had created with them, through his advocacy, had proved invaluable twice in three years and would be needed again as he faced the prospect of going toe-to-toe with the *Optimates*, headed by Cato. In addition, he had

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<sup>165</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 18

<sup>166</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 18 and Plut. *Caes.* 12

<sup>167</sup> Cic. *Att.* 2.1.9

shown himself to be a true friend to Pompey, his allegiance to him was beyond question now. Even with Pompey and the people, the two most powerful institutions in Rome, it would not be an easy battle.

## EPILOGUE

### **To Triumph or Petition?**

As Caesar neared the end of his Proprietorship in Spain in 60, his impending return began to be a cause for concern both for himself and for the *Optimates* in the city, for Caesar would be returning as a conquering hero and triumphant general. The declaration of the title *Imperator* by his troops and the triumph granted him by the Senate and People of Rome could not be shrugged off. In addition to these newer developments, his popularity in the city had not faltered. Caesar was a juggernaut, equaled or exceeded only by the great Pompey, returning to Rome in the hope of securing for himself the highest office in the Republic, that of Consul.

Suetonius states that Caesar hurried back from Spain even before his replacement had entered the province. The time for petitioning was drawing near and Caesar found himself in quite a predicament. In order to hold his triumph, he still must be in command of the army and in order to petition for the consulship he must stand as a private citizen.<sup>168</sup> Using this contradiction, Cato was beginning to formulate a plan that, if successful, might block Caesar from one or both of these courses.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 18.

<sup>169</sup> There is another option that is never mentioned in the primary or secondary sources. It is entirely possible that Cato believed that Caesar, having suffered this slight, would march on Rome to lay claim to his triumph and take the consulship by force.

Caesar reacted by immediately petitioning the senate, as Gelzer theorized he had done for Pompey, to be allowed to campaign *in absentia*. No sooner was this brought to the senate's attention than Cato began to speak against it. According to Plutarch, "...[Cato] saw that many had been contracted by Caesar, so he wasted the time for the debate and exhausted the day in speaking..."<sup>170</sup> It is true that this request was contrary to the law and constituted a last ditch effort by Caesar to secure both the honor of the triumph and the consulship. Caesar gave up this idea, deciding not to press his luck for the triumph and instead to return to the city, a private citizen, to petition for the consulship.<sup>171</sup> The most important aspect of this incident is not the way in which Caesar handled it but the way in which Cato, having exhausted the senate and his options, opted to stop the Senate from functioning rather than allow it to make a decision that might have been contrary to his desires. The power of Caesar was growing in the streets, in the Forum, and even in the Senate. The *Optimates* were beginning to lose control.

With the loss of control came every bit of the malice and personal animosity that would grind the Republic down to nothingness. The spite that was felt between Cato and Caesar exemplified senatorial infighting. It was no longer about politics for Cato, it was very personal, and it seems that he was willing to do anything to hamper Caesar, even if it meant to delay or stop actions that would benefit the state, the people, or even the senate itself. The rift between the *factiones* had been steadily growing since the deaths of Marius and Sulla, and the polarization of the parties had begun to severely curtail the

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<sup>170</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 13. Suetonius makes no mention of Cato's filibuster in his report (Suet. *Iul.* 18).

<sup>171</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 13 and Suet. *Iul.* 18

senate's ability to operate effectively. The year 59 would prove to be the year in which the fine cracks in the marbled facade of the Republic would begin to expand, fracturing the Republic beyond repair.<sup>172</sup>

## **Epilogue**

The consulship of Gaius Julius Caesar is one of the most extensively documented and well-analyzed epochs of the Late-Republic.<sup>173</sup> Within that year, Caesar brought together all of the elements that he had labored so diligently in fashioning over the span of the previous decade. The innovations he made here are worth mentioning briefly as they would presage the shape of things to come and would foreshadow the emergence of the Roman Empire.

Caesar, in order to combat the tactics of the *Optimates*, forged the most powerful association in the history of the Republic, which some mistakenly refer to as the 'first triumvirate'.<sup>174</sup> True, this powerful association was composed of three men, but any relationship to the group that would be founded twenty years later by Octavian Augustus ends there. Compared to the men who divided the Empire in thirds and bent the law to their every whim, the association of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus was more akin to a gentlemen's gardening club, attempting to determine the best way to grow and feed the Republic. There were no proscriptions, no division of provinces, no attempt made at

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<sup>172</sup> Gruen; Last Generation 81-82

<sup>173</sup> See Gelzer; Caesar 71-102, Meier; Caesar 204-223 and Kahn; Education 192-212. I will finish my look at the rest of the career of Caesar from the consulship to his death in 44 B.C.E. as part of a monograph or dissertation.

<sup>174</sup> See Gruen; Last Generation 83-120 for an in-depth examination of the creation and effect of the association of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus.

establishing complete control. As a result, these questions must be asked: first, what was the purpose of the association; second, how was the association cemented together; and third, how was the association actually used?

The demarcation between the association of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus and that of Augustus' Triumverate lies in the purpose for which it was created. Caesar attached these men to himself in order to defend against the attacks of the *Optimates* and to shift the balance of power in his favor. With the two most powerful men in Rome and, as has been shown previously, an incredibly large contingent of the populace at his side, Caesar was able to override the obstruction of the *Optimates*, specifically concerning a bill providing land allotments for the soldiers of Pompey's eastern campaigns.<sup>175</sup> The tactic was so effective in gaining the upper hand against their enemies in the Senate that the bill was passed and Bibulus fled the Senate, not returning for the entire year of the consulship, leaving Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus to exercise greater control over the course of the year 59.<sup>176</sup>

The success of the association, bearing fruit as it did in the case of the motion for land allotments, stirred Caesar to betroth his beloved daughter, Julia, to Pompey. Pompey then gave his daughter in marriage to Servilius, Julia's intended. Finally, Caesar wed Calpurnia, sister of Calpurnius Piso. He then used his connections to aid C. Piso in his

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<sup>175</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 20 and Plut. *Caes.* 14

<sup>176</sup> Suet. *Iul.* 20. In addition to his association on this matter with Pompey and Crassus, Caesar also ordered that the activities of the senate were to be published. This would allow the three men to connect directly with the people and would further illustrate the *Optimates* unwillingness to help them to secure benefits for the people.

bid for the consulship of 58.<sup>177</sup> Using marriage alliances to support such a relationship was not uncommon nor was it unprecedented. However, the stature and status of the individuals involved was peculiar. What this maneuver really did was change the nature of the relationship amongst the three, morphing *amacitia* into *familia*, allowing for greater latitude in the activities and intercession deemed culturally acceptable.<sup>178</sup>

With this newfound power, the association was able to successfully bid for land allotments for Pompey's veterans and to secure Caesar's posting to Gaul. In addition, they were able to effectively place desirable persons from their own party into the consulship, such as was the case with C. Piso. These actions may be construed as an attempt at asserting complete control; however, taken in the larger context, it is easy to see that this was not the goal. If complete and total tyranny was aimed at, why did men like Bibulus, Cato, and Cicero remain alive. Taking into account the actions of both Marius and Sulla, and the later actions that were taken by Augustus, this instance bears none of the marks of subversion and bloodshed. The decision to muzzle their enemies rather than to assassinate them was a strange one indeed, considering the precedents that had already been set and that would be used at the turn of the common era and, while it was certainly no time of wine and roses for their enemies, the association lacked the bloodthirsty and tyrannical tendencies that have been ascribed to it. In fact, the most

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<sup>177</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 14. By giving aid to C. Piso in his canvassing for the consulship, Caesar gave himself a bit of breathing room, ensuring that he could get to Gaul before the inevitable counterattack of the *Optimates*.

<sup>178</sup> See pgs. 29-31 Note the differences in reaction to Caesar arguing for the reinstatement of L. Cinna's (at that time, his brother-in-law) citizenship rights and his arguments against the arbitrary execution of Catiline and the other conspirators. Both parties had engaged in treason and had taken up arms against the state, yet the reaction to the latter incident was much more pointed than the reaction to the former. This is most likely to do with the fact that Caesar was related to Cinna and could presumably be seen to be doing his filial duty.



curious thing about powerful association of Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus was that it bore the mark of Caesar's most fruitful tactic: *clementia*.

### **Conclusion**

Caesar's early political career provides a text book example of campaigning and politics in the Late-Republic. It also illustrates the fact that the *cursus honorem* ran in tandem with a very specific set criteria, one that determined the public perception of fitness for office. In singularly Roman fashion, the *cursus honorum* prescribed the positions that a politician would have to hold, in order that he learn all of the things necessary to be successful. The holding of one office did not guarantee the vote of the people for the next. In order to understand more fully the political maneuvering of the Late-Republic, the notion of a second *cursus* must be added, a *cursus famarum*.

Caesar's entire career bespeaks the existence of such an unwritten code which is cited repeatedly in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*.<sup>179</sup> Reputation and connections are linked incontrovertibly with political success and, as with anything Roman, there were rules and procedures for gaining a reputation. Caesar began, even before the start of his career, to make moves and take positions that would further his reputation. This can account for his ability to hold every office at the precise age and precise interval throughout his career.

The first stage of his reputation building began prior to his official start in politics when Caesar denied Sulla's request that he divorce his wife, won the *corona civica*, and

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<sup>179</sup> See translation of the *Commentariolum* in the Appendix.

brought Dollabella and Antonius to trial for fraud, going so far as to travel to Greece to prosecute the case on behalf of the citizens of Macedonia. Already, Caesar had developed and demonstrated three different aspects of his reputation that would be observable throughout his career. First, Caesar would not do anything that might harm his *dignitas*, even at the behest of a man who had already put thousands to death. Second, martial valor was a critical component of a successful leader, and he exemplified it even as a young officer. Finally, he was willing to stir up trouble with powerful men and there was no length to which he would not go in order to support a client or friend. These three governing principles were mixed together with a fourth; Caesar was consistent.

The second stage coincides with the offices of the Military Tribune and the Quaestorship. His reputation having been made clear, Caesar began to draw connections between himself and others. He made every effort to espouse the cause of Pompey and Crassus, and to support them in their bid to return the power of the People's Tribune. Once he had lobbied for the return of the tribunician power, he used it to support the return of his brother-in-law. The funeral for his aunt Julia and his wife Cornelia stand as a testament to Caesar's aptitude for public display. They cemented his standing as head of the family and his return of the *imagines* of Marius introduced him to a new crowd of supporters. Building off the tenets of his reputation, he connected himself to Pompey and Crassus, the two most powerful men in Rome, to the Marian/*Popularis* cause and, even more powerfully, to the storied past of his own family, *ab urbe condita*, to the eternal gods themselves.

Reputation and connections solidly in place, Caesar finished the work he had already begun. Every fiber of his being had been spent in amassing a vast network of clients. He spent vast sums of money in helping them and the more people he helped, the more they flocked to him. Surely it was no small badge of honor for a Roman citizen to say that he or she was a client of no less than the Julii, or that their Patron was attendant upon their every need. The modifications he made to the Forum and his lavish games made every citizen aware of the time, energy, and money he was willing to spend on gaining and keeping their support. The importance he placed on their support was felt in every action he took. He fought mightily, both in Rome and in the Provinces, by arms and by legislation, to ensure that every Roman received their due. It was for this that the citizens of Rome emerged *en masse* and sought redress for his grievances. Again it was his reputation, connections, and his consistency that connected him to the people and they to him, a model of the Patron-Client relationship.

In summation, it must be understood that Julius Caesar was no Albert Schweitzer. He was not an altruist nor was he averse to any dirty trick, if the occasion called for it. He was a champion, not a hero. He fought for himself, his clients, and the people of Rome, rarely leaving the field with clean hands. In the end, he did not succeed because he was always three moves ahead, he succeeded because he combined three moves in one. He masked his motivations well and he played on the perceptions other people had of him and as a result, he was able to confound the foremost politicians of his age. Moral quandaries aside, it can be said that Caesar fought for what he thought was right, and if it happened to benefit him or his clients and associates, so much the better. This being said,

it is clear from Caesar's actions, which were recorded by Suetonius and Plutarch and from the tenets of the *Commentariolum*, that Caesar never overstepped the bounds of 'normal' political practice either in campaigning or in administering his office . Caesar's actions always seem to bear his own particular mark: excess tempered by regularity.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Gruen arrived at a similar conclusion in his 2009 work "Caesar as a Politician", and followed many of the same lines that I have followed here. Gruen neglected, however, to underscore Caesar's possible motivations for his actions which are readily found in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*. Gruen's discussion significantly differs from mine, in that he analyses Caesar's connections to other politicians rather than seeking out the circumstances and the methods he used to secure such connections, going so far as to neglect the campaigning process entirely. He chose to focus instead on Caesar amongst the politicians rather than to understand the dynamic between Caesar and the people, which he never admits is a driving force in Caesar's policy. Such a connection can only be made with the addition of the *Commentariolum* and a thorough understanding of the institutions, both political and physical, that were inexorably linked to the people's perception of the politician. Posing the discussion as he does simply replays the tired rhetoric of the Republic *sine* voters. He denies the necessity of the will of the people to the politician and, in doing so, robs Caesar of his true innovations in statecraft. See E. Gruen, "Caesar as a Politician"; *A Companion to Julius Caesar*; Ed. Miriam Griffin; Wiley-Blackwell; 2009 pgs. 23-36. It is important to note that the conclusion that Gruen arrives at in 2009 bears little resemblance to his conclusions in his 1974 masterwork *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*.

## APPENDIX

### ELECTIONEERING FOR DUMMIES: QUINTUS TULLIUS CICERO'S *COMMENTARIOLUM PETITIONIS*

#### **Introduction**

The document known as the *Commentariolum Petitionis* has been and continues to be an important source for understanding the Roman systems of canvassing and campaigning during the late Roman Republic. Penned as a letter between Quintus Tullius Cicero and his older, much better known brother, Marcus Tullius Cicero, the *Commentariolum* attempts to project a clearer picture of those things which ought to be the day-to-day concerns of the petitioner and the politician.<sup>181</sup> However, as rich as this document is, and as illuminating as it is, the *Commentariolum* has experienced its own fair share of detractors, so before extolling its virtues, it would be well to explore its purported vices.

Questions concerning the authenticity of the *Commentariolum* begin with the Godfather of modern Roman Republican scholarship, Theodor Mommsen.

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<sup>181</sup> "...sed ut ea quae in re dispersa atque infinita viderentur esse ratione et distributione sub uno aspectu ponerentur."

Unfortunately, a casual comment in Römisches Staatsrecht<sup>182</sup> regarding the title of *ordo equester* gave sufficient cause for the *Commentariolum* to be singled out for 150 years of scrutiny. Out from this initial misunderstanding, two main lines of argument emerged; the first sought to find further anachronisms with respect to specific lines of the *Commentariolum* that appear in the speeches and letters of Marcus, and the second deals specifically with fixing a date to the rhetorical style of the *Commentariolum*.<sup>183</sup>

The inherent difficulty in judging the *Commentariolum* by these criteria, and especially any text of the late Roman Republic, is that, in order to properly assess any document, a static sequence of events must be constructed. Anachronisms are only identifiable if they do not fit into the time constraints set forth by the scholar. The question of who is referencing whom is even more troublesome, for such an inquiry brings with it the biases and the preconceptions of the scholar. Writing style, and more specifically in this context Rhetorical style, is most critically effected by the construction of a rigid timeline of events, for it presupposes that style as such does not undergo any natural development or change over time. As a result, the importance of the

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<sup>182</sup> T. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht; Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, Austria; 1969. See pg. 484 and F.N. 3. Here Mommsen does not make the case that the title of *ordo equester* is anachronistic to the time of Quintus, but in this case, it does not refer to a specific class distinction as it does in the Empire. "...hier werden die in den *centuriae equitum* stehenden jungen Leute bestimmt durch die *auctoritas* des *ordo equester*; während doch eigentlich jene den *ordo equester* bilden."

<sup>183</sup> See G.L. Hendrickson, "The *Commentariolum Petitionis* Attributed to Quintus Cicero: Authenticity, Rhetorical Form, Style, Text"; The Decennial Publications; University of Chicago Press (1903) pgs. 71-93 for the most expansive work on the spuriousness of the *Commentariolum*. It is also highly instructive that Hendrickson himself refers to the work of ascertaining the authenticity of the *Commentariolum* as a "...question [that] is naturally not a burning one..." (pg. 71). See also J.S. Richardson, "Commentariolum Petitionis"; Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte; 1972 pg. 436 for a complete listing of the applicable work for and against the authenticity of the *Commentariolum*. See also R.G.M. Nisbet, "The *Commentariolum Petitionis*: Some Arguments Against Authenticity"; JRS; V.51 (1961) pg. 84.

determination of authenticity becomes lost in the confluence of theories, timelines, and arguments.<sup>184</sup>

Thankfully, in the particular case of the *Commentariolum*, the question of authenticity teeters on the verge of irrelevance. Given the temporal parameters accepted by both proponents and detractors, which range from 66 B.C. to the time of Augustus,<sup>185</sup> it should be clear that whoever produced this document had an understanding of the Roman campaigning process that far exceeds our own. Indeed, for the purposes of this commentary, the question of authorship is not imperative, as the information being extracted has nothing whatsoever to do with the political practices of either of the Cicero brothers, or the verification of any specific source or document native to the Late-Republic. The expressed purpose of this grammatical, syntactical, and historical analysis of the *Commentariolum* is to ascertain the value of this document as a “measuring-stick” of sorts, to understand what exactly constituted regular practices of Late-Republic Roman politicians.

The question of “regular” political practice is key to a practical understanding of the acts, the actors, and the events of the Late-Republic. If one considers that any Roman with political ambitions, due to the constant demands of the *cursus honorum*, would spend a large portion of their lives adhering to the politician's way of life, the tenets found in the *Commentariolum* become even more instructive. The *Commentariolum*,

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<sup>184</sup> See Richardson; 436. Richardson discusses the problems in arguing for the validity of any text after it has been deemed spurious.

<sup>185</sup> Richardson; 436-437

when it is used with these consideration in mind, will bring new insight into the actions and motivations of Roman politicians.

### **Translation of the *Commentariolum Petitionis***

I.[1] Though all those things are present in you that men are able to obtain, by nature, by practice, or by understanding, nevertheless I did not think it inconsistent with our friendship to write to you those thoughts, that came to mind, as I was thinking both day and night about your petition, my purpose being not so much that you might learn something new from these thoughts but that the ins and outs of campaigning, which appear so undefined and unrelated might be set down with reason and placed together under one view.<sup>186</sup>[2] Consider the composition of the state<sup>187</sup>, comprehend what you are seeking, be mindful of who you are. As you daily make your way down to the Forum you ought to repeat to yourself this mantra, ‘I am a new man, I seek the consulship, THIS IS ROME.’<sup>188</sup> To a great extent you will mitigate the newness of your name by the renown of your oratory. This ability has consistently held a great deal of dignity. It is unthinkable that a man who is considered worthy of representing ex-consuls would be reckoned unworthy to be a consul himself. Therefore, since it is from this reputation you are setting out and since you are whatever you are because of this ability, go prepared to

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<sup>186</sup> Nisbet; 84. Proponents against authorship point out repeatedly that the “purpose [of the *Commentariolum*] is not clear.” This is odd, seeing that Quintus sets out his purpose for writing the document with an ut-clause of purpose. See also A. Eussner, “*Commentariolum petitionis examinatum atque emendatum*”; Würzburg 1872 pg.1

<sup>187</sup> Here *civitas* refers to the collective body of citizens, i.e., the state

<sup>188</sup> Note the parallel construction utilized in the suggested meditation. Interestingly, the same construction is also a parallel construction to section XIV.54.



speak as if your entire character will be judged on the basis of your individual speeches.  
 [3] Take care that the services of this faculty, which I know to be especially apparent in  
 you, are prepared and ever ready. Often consider what Demetrius wrote concerning the  
 zeal and efforts of Demosthenes.<sup>189</sup> Next, take care that both the number and the ilk of  
 your friends are apparent. Indeed, you possess what many new men have not had,  
 namely all the publicani, nearly the whole equestrian order, many municipalities  
 specifically loyal to you, many men of every rank who have been defended by you in  
 court, some of the collegia and, in addition, many youths who gravitate towards you  
 because of your zeal for oratory, and every day you have a constant and large attendance  
 of friends.[4] Take care that you retain them by reminding them and questioning them  
 and employing every strategy so that they understand that there will be no other time for  
 those who are indebted to your cause to show their thanks, and for those who wish for  
 you to be in their debt, to obligate you. In fact it is the backing of noble men and  
 especially ex-consuls that seems to be able to help the 'new man' the most. It is useful, if  
 you should desire to attain the consulship and be numbered among them, to be thought by  
 them worthy of their position and of their number.[5] All of these men must be diligently  
 asked for their support; they must be told and they must be persuaded that we have  
 always felt as the Optimates do concerning the Republic; we have seldom been with the  
 Populares and if we seem to have said anything of a popular nature, we did this with the  
 goal of bringing Cn. Pompeius on board, so that we might have that very influential man

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<sup>189</sup> Unfortunately, the works of Demetrius of Phaleron are lost to us and, as a result, so to is this specific reference. However, M. Cicero did reference Demosthenes in his own works extensively and so he might have shared such discussions with his brother Quintus. See C. Wooten, "Cicero's Reactions to Demosthenes: A Clarification"; *The Classical Journal*; V.73 (1977) pgs. 37-43 for Cicero's mentions of Demosthenes.

either as a friend in this campaign or, at the very least, not as an enemy.<sup>190</sup>[6]

Furthermore, you must work diligently to win over the noble youths or so that you keep zealous the noble youths whom you already have.<sup>191</sup> They bring with them a great deal of dignity and you have many. Make certain that they know how much force you think resides them. If you lead them in such a way that those who were merely not opposed to your success now long for it<sup>192</sup>, they will prove very useful indeed.

II.[7] Furthermore the type of nobles who petition against you helps your status as a new man a great deal; for no one would dare say that their nobleness was more useful to them than your virtue is to you. For who could conceive that P. Galba and L. Cassius, born into the highest class, would ever petition for the consulship?<sup>193</sup> Therefore you see that men from the most well appointed families, because they lack the nerve, are not equal to you. As for Antonius and Catiline they are a nuisance.[8] Indeed, for a man who is determined, blameless, well-spoken and gracious in the eyes of discerning men they are the most desirable competitors; both were assassins from a young age, both are full of raucous

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<sup>190</sup> Due to his success on the battlefield and exceptional commands, Cn. Pompeius Magnus was a veritable force of nature in Roman Politics and as such, he was sought out by politicians of all sorts to back their campaigns, including Caesar.

<sup>191</sup> *habere/tenere*- in this case, used in a subjunctive purpose clause governed by the imperative *elabora*. Here the political connotation most likely represents lesser and greater degrees of control over subordinate groups of adherents as represented by Lewis and Short.

<sup>192</sup> "...ii qui volunt cupiunt..." Note here the attributive position of the relative clause, Lit.- "...that those who desire, long for..."

<sup>193</sup> Asconius, *In Toga Candida* V.82. "Sex competitores in consulatus petitione Cicero habuit, duos patricios, P. Sulpiciam Galbam, L. Sergium Catilinam; quattuor plebeios ex quibus duos nobiles, C. Antonium, M. Antoni oratoris filium, L. Cassium Longinum, duos qui tantum non primi ex familiis suis magistratum adepti erant, Q. Cornificium et C. Licinium Sacerdotem." Asconius, on the one hand, describes Galba as a sober and holy man, Cassius on the other hand, "...seemed to be more stupid than he was unrighteous and after a few months he appeared to be in league with the conspiracy of Cataline and also had been the supporter of the most bloody opinions." Quintus points out this pairing as odd, undoubtedly due to the adverse natures of the two men.

desires, and both are flat broke. Concerning the former of these two we have seen his assets confiscated, and still further we have heard his voice while under oath say that he was unable to contend with Greeks on an equal footing in a Roman Court<sup>194</sup>, we know that he was forcefully ejected from the senate by the opinion of the most qualified Censors<sup>195</sup>, we had him for a competitor in the praetorian election with his friends Sabidius and Panthera<sup>196</sup>, since he had no one else whom he could place on the ballot (can you believe that he bought a slave girl straight off the auction block and installed her in his home as a mistress during his magistracy?); furthermore in his petitioning for the consulship he preferred to plunder all of the Cappadocians through the most malicious ambassadors than to be present in Rome and beg the assistance of the Roman voters.[9] And the other, Good Gods! what is so great about him? In the first place he is from the same class as Antonius. Is he not from a higher rank? No. But he has more courage. On what account? Antonius fears his own shadow, Catiline fears not even the laws, born into the poverty of his father, brought up in his sister's whorish ways, strengthened by the killing of citizens, whose introduction to politics was a bloodbath(for Sulla had put him in charge of those Gauls, whom we remember, who deprived the Titinii, the Nanni and the Tanusi of their heads); along with them, Catiline killed, with his own hands, Quintus Caecilius, a very good man, the husband of his own sister, a Roman knight, a man who

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<sup>194</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 1.4. Caesar brought Cn. Antonius to trial for *repetundae* in 76.

<sup>195</sup> See Broughton; *MRR V.II* 161. L. Aurelius Cotta and his unattested colleague are the most likely candidates for the *optimorum censorum* reference of II.8. See also Dio 37.9.4

<sup>196</sup> Abl. of Separation with understood *eum*. Since the 1st pl. perf. tense is used here severally to describe the things that the Cicero Brother's have witnessed, understood, and done, construe Antonius as object.

proclaimed no party, who was always naturally peaceful, and had become more so in his old age.<sup>197</sup>

III.[10] Why should I even call that man a candidate, who beat down the most beloved man of the Roman people, Marcus Marius, with a vine switch in full public view, while leading him to his own funeral pyre, mutilated him there with all sorts of torture, took him, while he was still alive, by the hair with his left hand, lopped off his head with the sword in his right, and lifted up the severed head high as rivulets of blood flowed through his fingers; who then took to living with actors and with gladiators, the former abetting his lusts, the latter his crimes; who has entered no place so holy and so religious that, even if no particular crime was committed, he has not left behind a suspicion of unseemliness because of his profligacy; who recruited as his best friends the Curii and Annii from the Senate house, the Sapalae and Carvili from the auction houses, and from among the Roman knights the Pompilii and Vettii; who was so audacious, so wicked and, at the same time, so artful and efficient in his lusts, that he could debauch young free men almost in the laps of their parents. Why should I even write to you now concerning Africa?<sup>198</sup> Why should I write to you concerning the pronouncements of the witnesses? These things are all well known, and these things you must read more often; but nevertheless it does not seem that I should omit that, he left the trial, in the first place, as poor as some of his judges began it, and secondly, as an object of so much envy that the judges daily cried out for another trial. This man conducts himself in such a way that

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<sup>197</sup> See Sall. *Bell. Cat.* 5. for Sallust's appraisal of L. Catalina.

<sup>198</sup> The trial of Catiline for *repetundis* after his propraetorship of 67-66 B.C.E in North Africa was the beginning of his descent into the conspiracy of 64 and 63 B.C.E. His questionable activities as governor led to his inability to seek the consulship in 65. See Sall. *Cat.* 18.3

they fear him more even if he is quiet than they condemn him if he makes a move.[11]

How much better is the fortune that has been afforded your petition than for the new man Gaius Coelius.<sup>199</sup> He was petitioning against two men who were most noble in such a way that everything about them- such as their extreme native intellect and modesty, their many kindnesses, as well as their very great plan for and diligence in petitioning- was worth more than their nobility itself. Coelius, although he was born into a much lower class and was better than them in almost nothing, carried the election.[12] What does this mean for you? If you act on those things that your nature and your zeal— from which you have always profited—bestow upon you, those things that a reckoning of your time desires, that you are able to do, that you ought to do, then your contest with those competitors, who are in no way as noted for their noble birth as for their vices, will not be difficult. Truly, is it possible to find a citizen, who is so reprobate as to desire, by one vote to bury two daggers into the Republic.

IV.[13] Since I have shown what factors you possess— and are able to possess— that mitigate against your novelty, it seems that I should now speak concerning the magnitude of your petition. You are, after all, petitioning for the consulship, an office for which no one considers you unworthy, although there are many who are envious. You, a man from the equestrian class, seek the highest office of the citizenry, an office that is lofty in such a way that it brings to the brave, well spoken and blameless man more than to other men. Do not think for a second that those who have held that office do not see the greatness you will have when you have obtained that same office. I suspect that those men who

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<sup>199</sup> See Broughton; *MRR* V.II 549. The most likely candidate for C. Coelius mentioned here held the consulship of 94. Nothing is known of his competitors mentioned here.

were born into consular families, who have not obtained the status of their ancestors, are envious unless they love you to the fullest degree.<sup>200</sup> Furthermore I reckon that new men of Praetorian status do not desire to be overtaken by you in the race for honor, unless they have been brought over by your beneficence.[14] In these times how many amongst the people are envious, how many have been alienated from their family tradition by new men, I am sure you certainly know a few. Still, there is not a little anger leveled at you on account of the court cases that you argued out of necessity. Even now you must see this, as you have given so much effort towards augmenting the glory of Pompeius, merely because of this there are many who might consider you to be a friend.[15] For this reason, since you both seek the greatest post and you comprehend all that is arrayed against you, it is necessary that you apply every reasoning, care, labor and diligence.

V.[16] The work of petitioning for the magistracy is divided into the care of two distinct concerns, the first which must be placed on the zeal of friends, the second on the desire of the people. It is proper to cultivate the zeal of friends by benefits and duties and by the long standing, meaningful and enjoyable nature of the friendship. However the appellation of “friend” has a much looser meaning during the petition than during the rest of life. Whoever shows any tendency towards desiring your election, who cultivates a friendship with you, who repeatedly comes to your house, he must be held to number among your friends. Moreover, those who are friends to you out of a purer reason, namely those who are related to you by blood or marriage or business partnership or

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<sup>200</sup> For a clearer picture of the troubles of the new man, see Gruen, Last Generation 136-137

indeed any other necessity,<sup>201</sup> being kind and pleasant to them is of the greatest benefit to your petition.[17] It must be carefully elaborated that each one is an intimate and most valued member of your household, so that he loves you and more fervently desires your election, so that from your fellow tribesmen, to your neighbors, to your clients, to the freeman and even to your slaves, that each understands how much you value him; for nearly every conversation concerning your reputation flows out into the Forum on the good word of your household.[18] Beyond these types of friends is the type of friend which you must attend to carefully. These are your illustrious friends, both in honor and also in name, who, although they might not zealously petition for your cause, they do bring to the petition some dignity; you must obtain the magistracy through the right channels, the most important of these being the ex-consuls, next the plebeian Tribunes, next the most gracious men amongst the Centuriate, and lastly you must bring together those who hope or hope for any benefit from your tribe or century. When you have brought these men together you must make it clear to them that great works will be returned to them if they join your cause. For down through the years these ambitious men have been eager to work it out amongst themselves with every zeal and effort, so that they are able to bring about anything they ask of their tribe. You must make these men understand, however many of them that you are able, so that they desire your victory in both their hearts and their minds.[19] For If there are gracious men present, then they ought to prepare everything for you; I am confident you have taken the appropriate steps to secure the favor of such men. For in these past two years four of the most gracious

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<sup>201</sup> *alicuius necessitudinis*- There is a clear hierarchy to be found amongst the friends a candidate petitions, and here it is clearly laid out.

men you have secured as friends, namely C. Fundanius, Q. Gallius,<sup>202</sup> C. Cornelius, and C. Orcivius. These men brought their cases to you, which I know resulted in their friends retaining your services and strengthening your position, as I was there. At this time it is crucial that you make clear the debt they owe to you by often reminding them, asking them, and by making your position firm, taking care that they understand that there will be no other time for them to show their thankfulness. Indeed men are roused up towards even more diligent zeal by both the fact that you will one day finish your tenure as consul and by the more recent benefits you have given them.<sup>203</sup> [20] All in all, since the friends you secured in the defense of their cases are the most useful to your petition, make it plain to all those who you hold bound, divide and arrange it so there is a duty for each to perform; and in this way you have not been unduly bothersome to anyone at anytime and in this way take care that they understand everything you reckon they owe you and that you waited until this moment to collect.<sup>204</sup>

VI.[21] But seeing that men are best led towards well wishing and towards a zeal for voting by these three things, gifts, hope and like minded desire, attention must be turned to each aspect and which of these might best serve a given situation. In the first case men are led by fewer gifts if they believe the cause to be worthwhile enough to rationalize the

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<sup>202</sup> For further information on Marcus' defense of Q. Gallius, see J.T. Ramsey, "A Reconstruction of Q. Gallius' Trial for 'Ambitus': One Less Reason for Doubting the Authenticity of the Commentariolum Petitionis"; *Historia*; V.29 (1980) pgs. 402-421

<sup>203</sup> "...spe reliquorum tuorum officiorum et iam recentibus beneficiis ad studium navandum excitabuntur." *ad studium navandum*- repetitive in translation but an interesting method of creating a hyper-intensive statement in the midst of a hysteron-proteron construction.

<sup>204</sup> Lawyers in Rome were not legally allowed to collect fees for their services; however, they could coerce those people whom they had defended in court to petition on their behalf. Hence, the law courts were seen as an important stepping stone to high office.



effort of voting, that is not to say that you have not been useful to them, you have, they simply do not understand that if they do not take this opportunity to repay their debt to you that they will never again be seen as upright men. That is merely how it is, nevertheless they must be asked for, or even better, led to their opinions, so that those who so far have been put under an obligation to us are able to see that we, in turn, will be obligated to them.[22] As for the second case, those who are held by a sense of hope are still even more diligent and dutiful. Make sure, that your help seems to be prepared and constantly held forth. Then make sure that you are seen doing this plainly and conscientiously so that they understand that you are a diligent watchman for your duties<sup>205</sup> so that it becomes apparent how much there is to be gained from each man.[23] The third case pertains to the type of men who are ardently zealous, for whom there must be thankfulness, you must adapt your speeches for them towards the causes, on account of which, each will seem to be zealous for you; signify that you desire to deal with them equally, and having led them towards friendship in the hope of familiarity, it will be crucial for this friendship to be confirmed in the traditional way. Furthermore, amongst all these types it is possible to determine the ability of each one by judgement and examination, so that you know both in what way you might serve them and what you might expect and request from each.[24] In truth, there are certain gracious men in your neighborhoods and municipalities, There are generous men and wealthy who, although before this they did not seek after your thanks, nevertheless from this time on they ought to make effort for your cause or they ought to desire to make an effort, which they are

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<sup>205</sup> "...ut spectatorem te officiorum esse intellegant diligentem..."

easily able to do; these types of men must be served so that they themselves understand that and see what you expect from each one, exactly what you consider their debt to be, and what of their debt you chose to recall. Moreover there are other who either are able to do nothing or are yet so disappointing to their own tribes since they neither hold the commensurate spirit or facilities to be useful at this time; You must recognize that these men are known to us, lest great hope is placed in anyone of these types and too little comes of the pairing.

VII.[25] Although it is useful to have an appropriate amount of friends to be a support and a defense, nevertheless in this time of petitioning, very many and extremely useful friendship are formed: for in other times of life having so many friends is considered an annoyance, however having so many friends is favorable. In all honesty you have a power which, at other times in life, you would not be able to befriend whosoever you wished, if this was attempted at any other time it would seem to be foolish, however unless you attempt to befriend many people and diligently then you would not seem to be much of a candidate.[26] Moreover, I will make this very clear to you that not one of your competitors has been joined for any other reason than pure necessity. These people will not be easily swayed if you contend with them. You would do well for yourself if your friendship with them was not brief and expressly for the purposes of gaining their vote, but your friendship should be strong and longstanding so that your beneficence be worthy, so that you love them and owe them<sup>206</sup>. Do this in such a way that they understand that you esteem them as being of the greatest importance to

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<sup>206</sup> Reflexives positioned before the ut. "...se ut ames et sibi ut dubeas..."

your campaign.[27] Believe me that no one will allow this time of establishing a friendship with you pass them by, least of all those who have brought their error to you so that they might petition with you rather than those for whom the duties of friendship are either valued little or are fled from entirely. I strongly advise you not to follow those who are not even able to begin.[28] For how does Antonius begin to join men to himself and invite to friendship those same men who he is unable to call by name. Certainly nothing seems more foolish to me than to consider a man to be zealous for you, whom you do not even know. Certainly conspicuous glory and dignity and the doing of great deeds are useful in petitioning but ignorant men gain no votes by honor; Certainly men of little account, ineffective, without a sense of duty, without natural intelligence, with a bad reputation and without friends exceeds the one full of zeal and is protected from judgement by all his wealth. Subsequently, he is not without blame for his negligence.

VIII.[29] On account of what we have just discussed take care that you have many and varied friends in all the centuries so that you might hold the Centuriate fast. The first thing, which I am sure is very clear, is that diligent and gracious Senators and Knights of every order must be embraced and that many industrious men of the city and many freedmen of a gracious and diligent nature are constantly milling about in the Forum, who will be able to be turned by you or through common friendships. Take the greatest care that they long for you. You must work for them, you must seek them out, you must commission duties for them, you must make it absolutely clear that you have every intention of bestowing on them the greatest of benefits.[30] Then you must have a plan for the whole city, for every Collegia, for every village and neighborhood. If you join to

you the first men from these organizations in friendship, you can easily hold the rest of them. After this fix your sights on the whole of Italy, so that you have them separated and apportioned in your mind and your memory, lest you not hold sway over any municipality, colony, prefecture or any part of Italy, since you were not able to keep their distinctions patterned firmly enough in your mind.[31] You must make an eager search and investigate men from every region, you know them, seek them out. Strengthen them, care for them so that they petition for you in their own neighborhoods as if they stood for the candidacy themselves. They will desire your friendship if they will see you seeking after their friendship. Do this so that they understand by your speech that you have a plan which is beneficial for them to follow. Municipal men and rustics, if they are known to us by name, they will think that they are our friends. If they further believe that our presence there garners any protection for them they will not let the occasion pass them by. You both know and easily understand what other people and most of your competitors do not, that friendship cannot exist without some sort of guarantee.[32] Neither is this enough, even though it is important, but hope follows from usefulness and usefulness from friendship, lest you be seen to be a name caller only and not a true friend. Since this is how it is and these same men on account of their own ambition possess the greatest power amongst their own tribes, you will hold zealous men in the centuries and others amongst the tribes and on account of your plan their municipalities, or neighborhoods, or colleges they will be strong desirers for your installation as Consul and they will hold their greatest hope that you will owe them for their services.[33] Now, it seems to me that the Centuries of the Knights are much more easily to be held by

diligence. First, come to know the Knights (for truly they are few), then seek them out (for it is much easier to join the young men in friendship). Next hold with you the best and most zealous of men from amongst the youths; moreover at that time, because you are a member of the equestrian order, those that follow the authority of order, if diligence is applied to these concerns by you, you will hold not only the desire of the order but by this you make friends of every single member of the Centuries.<sup>207</sup> Now, the zeals of the youths are miraculously great and honest, in voting, in demonstrating, in announcing and in attending you.

IX.[34] Seeing that the act of attendance has been on your mind of late, this thing too must be taken for, so that you might make use of each type and order and age group. For out of this abundance of different types you will be able to reasonably infer your standing in those same camps of men and also the facilities that will be made available to you. Furthermore there are three important aspects of attendance, the first concerns saluters in your home, the second those who accompany you to the Forum, and the third concerns those who constantly attend you.[35] Saluters are more common than the others and according to custom they come at the time of the petitioning more than ever. You must take it upon yourself that this thing appears to be less of a duty and more of a favor to you. You must noticeably turn your attention to those who come into your home; more specifically you must put on a show for their friends, who have heard tell of you and often you must speak to them personally. In this way, men often give themselves to a candidate, for after they have gone to meet many candidates and they see a candidate to

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<sup>207</sup> "...ordinis solum voluntate..." and "...singulorum amicitiiis..." Quintus repeatedly places the friendship of many individuals over the general consent of any particular Order or Group.

be someone who turns his attention to his duties in the greatest way, they will desert the others, little by little they will stop attending them, and subsequently will leave from the false group as strong voters. Now you must attend to this next matter more diligently. If you catch wind of anyone, who has come as a drone,<sup>208</sup> as they say, either pretend that you sense it, or that you know it or that you have heard about it. If he desires to atone for the guilt he feels since he has been found out, you strengthen his desire for you by never having doubted him nor ought you ever doubt him in future. If he thinks himself inadequate to be a friend he will be an inadequate friend. Furthermore, it is useful to know the mind of each man so that you are able to know how much confidence to place to each one.[36] Now as to the duties of those who attend you down to the Forum, these attendants are significantly more important than that of the Saluters. You must signify and also make clear that you view this as a greater favor to you since you must go down at a certain time to make the greatest impression. The crowd with which you daily descend to the Forum carries with it great opinion and great dignity.[37] The third group, which is composed of the more affluent of the attendees<sup>209</sup>, is by far the most important. You will gain much from those who volunteer, take care that they know that you will be obligated to them eternally; Furthermore, as for those who owe you, you must plainly coerce this duty from them, they who are able, on account of age and business, to attend with you, as for those who are unable to attend you they must send dependents in their stead. I strongly urge you towards this end and I suggest that you always go down with a

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<sup>208</sup> *fucum*- drone, most likely refers to some kind of spy sent by other competitors.

<sup>209</sup> *adsidus*- See Lewis and Short entry.

multitude.[38] In addition the crowd carries with it great praise and the greatest dignity, if those who you have defended, and those you have saved and those who have been freed from judgement attend you. The request of attendance you must plainly demand from these people since you charged them nothing and some obtained through you a material thing, some their honor, and some all their good health and fortunes. There shall not be any other time when they might be able to return your gift, which must be repaid by duty.

X.[39] And since this entire letter<sup>210</sup> has been centered on the zeals of friendships, it seems that we should not pass by the kinds of friends which ought to be avoided. All affairs are full of fraud and snares and treachery, not just at this time. Concerning these troubles there is a perpetual dispute as to the best method of being able to judge the true well-wisher from the pretender; this is of such great importance at this time to bear in mind. Your greatness of virtue drives these very men to pretend to be friends to you and drives them to envy. You must esteem this thing in the same manner as did Epicharmeios, when he said that the strength and art of wisdom is not to believe anything too readily.<sup>211</sup>[40] When you have established the zeals of your friends, then you still must learn the plans and types of your obstructors and adversaries. There are three types of these, one you have injured, the second dislikes you for no reason, the third who are ardent friends of you competitors. Those who you have injured, since you spoke against them on behalf of a friend, you must bear you soul plainly to them. You must remind them that what you did you did out of necessity, you must lead yourself to their causes, in

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<sup>210</sup> Author points back to previous sections of the letter with the word *oratio*.

<sup>211</sup> Epicharmeios- 6th century Greek comic playwright with no extant works. See Diog.Laert. VIII.78

the hope that if they will unite themselves to you in friendship, that you will be equally zealous and dutiful for them. For those who dislike you for no good reason you must give them presents or hope or you must signify that you work with zeal towards them so that they are led away from their distortion of mind. For those who desire the foreign friendships of your competitors the same strategy applies, if you are able to implement it in an upright manner, you must make clear that you bear heartfelt good wishes for those same men who are your competitors.

XI.[41] Since enough has been said regarding the establishment of friendship, we must now turn our attention toward the other part of the petition which turns on considerations of popularity. The people desire name calling, flattery, constant attendance, kindness, gossip and a hope in the Republic.[42] The first thing you must do so that you know the people is to make yourself known, so that it is published publicly, you must then augment this view so that everyday your reputation becomes better. No other action seems to me so popular nor more pleasing. Next, any ability which you do not possess by nature you must produce in your mind and you must pretend so that you seem to do it naturally. Although your nature is strong in many things, it seems in a few months nature is able to be conquered by business and politicking. For kindness is not absent in you, the kindness which is worthy of a good and agreeable man. However, it is the toil of laborious flattery, which if it is done in other parts of life it is a fault and unseemly, nevertheless during the petitioning it is necessary, unless it causes you to join yourself with some lesser man, then it is unrighteous, when there is friendship there is not so much blame, for the candidate it is necessary, the face and countenance and speech of



whom unite together to influence whomever of the people who feel the need for change and adaptation.[43] At this time there is no maxim of attendance, for the word is self explanatory. Certainly it is in no place useful to vehemently separate yourself from the people, nevertheless there are certain benefits to be gained from attendance, not only in Rome and not only in the Forum but to seek constantly and often to call upon the same men separately and not to bring them all together so that anyone is able to speak, what could possibly follow from this, if it is not asked by you strongly and diligently.<sup>212</sup>[44] Moreover, courtesy stretches widely. There is something to be said for familiarity, although it is not possible to achieve familiarity with all the people, nevertheless if your kindness is praised by friends, then the multitude is pleased; There is something to communal dinners, which dinners must be made by you and must be attended by your friend both in the tribes and at large; There is still more to be said for labors, which you must display and communicate. Take care that, in addition to this, they seek you out day and night, and share not only at the doors of your house but even by your countenance and posture, which are themselves the doors to the soul; If your doors are like your countenance, and they appear to be hidden and closed up, then they will invite back few to petition. Men, truly, do not merely promise themselves to the candidate because they wish to petition on his behalf, but they desire to be promised abundance and honors from the candidate in turn.[45] Wherefore this certainly is an easy maxim to follow. You should make it apparent that you intend to reward them zealously and willfully, with the

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<sup>212</sup> Statement in crux“...quod eius consequi possis, si abs te non sit rogatum...” Possible resolution in the rhetorical, “what are you able to obtain from him, if you have not asked?” Statement would be grammatically and syntactically complete without the crux.

end result in mind of actually seeing it through. This is the more difficult act and ought to be applied only during your petition, as you would not be able to change this part of your nature. It is important to be able to say no to someone agreeably, which on the one hand is the quality of a good man, and on the other hand is the quality of a good petitioner. For when something is sought that you are not able to give honestly and without detriment, we must ask ourselves how we might refuse someone beautifully, in order that we do not go back on our word to another friend's cause,<sup>213</sup> you must point out the necessity of your refusal and you must demonstrate that you bear no ill will, so that you persuade him that you fully intend to repair the damage done by offering him any other gifts he might desire.

XII.[46] I have heard someone say this concerning certain orators to whom he handed down his case, that the speech of the man who declined his case was more pleasing to him than the man who accepted it. In this way men are known more by their face and by their oratory than by their own kindness and actions. Truly, this saying must be relatively difficult for you to persuade Platonic man of, but that is neither here nor there. I shall counsel you at this time about the time to come when you must deny someone on account of the necessity of some duty, they who have been denied must be able to part from your company having been soothed and made even in their temperament. Moreover at these times you should deny them saying that your hands are tied either by business of friends or that you are pressed by weightier causes or a prior undertaking. Our enemies are divisive and are all of the mind that they would rather be lied to than to be denied.[47] C.

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<sup>213</sup> Interesting change from 2nd person singular to 1st person plural. It appears that Quintus will be liable for his brother's refusal of favors and/or services.

Cotta, a master of ambitious petitioning was accustomed to say of his own style, that “if he was not asked against duty, he was wont to promise anything to anybody, he thought it best to impart to those who were best placed to help him; For this reason he denied no one, and he often wondered why those he promised did not take advantage of the things that had promised, why he had more free time than he thought; and his house could not be filled so full, he who returned as much as he saw he himself was able to march out with; the unexpected happens so that they lead to ends which you have not thought, those things which you believe to be within your hands are led in ways which you did not expect; then the worst that could happen is that the man who you lied to might be angry.”[48] If you promise this, and you are uncertain both in a day and in a few days; If you then deny the request you will certainly immediately alienate those who are with us and the multitude. Truly, there are a lot more people who ask than those who make use of it, with the result that it is permitted to use the works of others. For this reason it is enough that these people, at some time, may be angry towards you in the Forum and this is better than everyone continually coming angry to your house, especially those who have been denied. They are filled up with a much greater anger than those who see how you have been hampered on account of some cause, so that which was promised, if there was any way, you would desire to fulfill the request.[49] I do not see that this conflicts with any of my prior points, which have concerned my investigation of petitioning for the people, I will continue to follow this argument that all these things pertain not so much to the zeal of friends than they pertain to your reputation with the people, and if it contains anything of this sort, respond with kindness, serve with zeal for your undertakings and

you make a test of your friends, nevertheless I say at this point, the means by which you will be able to capture the heart of the multitude, so that your house be filled until nightfall, so that many might hold hope for your guardianship, so that more take their leave of you feeling more amicably than when they arrived, so that the ears of the best men might be filled with the best speeches.

XIII.[50] Truly we must carry on, as we must speak about rumor, in what ways it must be put to the greatest service. The things which have been said of all the best oration, the same things they give strength to frequenting of rumors in the multitude. Praise for speakers, the efforts of the Publicani and the Equestrian Order, the desires of noble men, the frequent attendance of the youths, the attendance of those who have been defended by you, the multitude of those who appear publicly on behalf of your cause from the municipalities, in order to understand men, it would be well for you to call on them in a kindly manner, to seek their attendance diligently, so that they both value you highly and say good things freely, so that your house is filled for much of the night, and so that a crowd of all the aforementioned types are present, so that your oration is composed to be satisfactory to everyone, by many works and affairs. Let all those things which you are able to do by labor and art and diligence be done, so that fame does not arrive on account of these deeds alone, but so that the populace, recognizing your efforts, turns itself to you.[51] At this time, you applied yourself to the urban multitude, who hold meetings, and to their efforts in supporting Pompeius, having returned to the cause of Manilius and have defended Cornelius<sup>214</sup>. Those zeals must be summoned forth by us

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<sup>214</sup> string of abl. abs. with conjunctions.

which no one holds at this time, even this same thing holds desires of splendid men. This must still be brought to pass so that everyone knows that your election is Pompey's greatest desire and that you intend to vehemently follow after his plans.[52] Finally, take care that throughout the whole petition that it is full of pomp, of brightness, that it is full of nobility and lustrous, that it is popular, that it has the greatest visibility and dignity and lastly, if a reason can be found that infamy appears in your competitors, either snares or lusts or bribery whichever suits the morals of each best, you must demand their prosecution.[53] Still it must also seem that there is the greatest hope of good and of honest opinion in this petition; nevertheless you must not grasp after the Republic during the petition, neither in the Senate nor in the Comitia, but indeed you must restrain these desires, so that the Senate figures you are one of them, because in this way you might survive the defense of you auctoritas. The Knights and the good men and the landed gentry understand from your deeds in life that you have a fondness for leisure and peaceful things. As far as it is concerned, you have been for the multitude a popular man both in speaking and judgement, make it clear you have no intention of changing yourself from your habitual nature.<sup>215</sup>

XIV.[54] These things have been constantly coming to my mind concerning those two morning meditations we spoke of earlier, which I reminded you must be brought to mind everyday: "I am a new man, I petition for the consulship." The third remains, "This is Rome," the state from its very beginning was brought together in unity, a state in which many crimes, many fallacies and many sins whirl about in every class. The arrogance of

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<sup>215</sup> Marcus is advised to sit on the fence as a popular conservative.

many, the obstinacy of many the evil works of many, the haughtiness of many, the hate and anger of many about to be carried out. I perceive there to be in the whole of humanity great men of wisdom and artifice, and of these there are those who avoid these evil ways and who turn themselves to avoid offense, bragging, and snares. However, I perceive that there is one man who adapts to himself a variety of such great morals and words and desires.[55] You must still press on in the manner of the latter man and you must still take up a position and hold to this way of life which you have set up, these things having been said, you must excel in oratory. By oratory Romans are held, and are enticed and by oratory are both snares and wounds are repelled. And Seeing that in this defective state oratory is greatest, because bribery is wont to be forgotten when it has been placed between virtue and dignity. Speak well so that you are well known, do this so that you know that you are a man capable of bringing about the greatest fear of judgment and danger in your competitors. Do all this so that they know that they are guarded and also observed by you. Since you speak with diligence, with authority and power then having achieved your hold on the equestrian order, they will fear your zeal. [56] Also, I do not wish you to display these things to them openly, so that you seem to be meditating on accusing any of your competitors at this time, but so that by fear you might more easily obtain that which you seek to gain and in this wise by the even stretching of every nerve and faculty we might obtain that which we seek. I see nothing to be so iniquitous as Electoral bribery with which some centuries, with great effort, recall their own connected men for free.[57] For this reason if we are watchful for dignified things and if we rouse well wishing men towards the greatest zeal and if we

divide offices to our zealous and gracious men, and if we set forth summons to our competitors, we cast fear upon their followers, we surround the electoral bribers by any means, all this is possible to be done so that no bribery exists or that it has no effect. [58] These are the things which I presumed that I knew no better than you but since you were otherwise occupied, it was more possible for me to bring together these thoughts in one place and once they had been thoroughly written, to send to you. Notwithstanding, these things which have been written thusly, and are not for everyone who seeks honors, but they are applicable for you individually at this time and to your specific petition, nevertheless if you see anything that ought to be changed or removed entirely or if there is anything You say I might have passed by, I would wish you to tell me; For I desire this little book of petitioning to be considered perfect in every way.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> This last statement could possibly account for the fact that the use of this document in ascertaining normal political practice has been limited at best.

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